TAKE NOTICE that via this communication, you are conceding the breach of your statutory duty owed to Dr. Verma besides the torts of malicious prosecution and Charter breaches, perpetrated against Dr. Verma by College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (CPSBC or College) through admitting the truth of the following seventy (70) largely legislative facts before 4:00 PM on November 20, 2006 pursuant to a modified and abridged Rule 255 to the effect that Attorney General of Canada (AGC) concedes:

THAT CPSBC concedes that the reckless failure on the part of the CPSBC to investigate several complaints of denial of medical attention, which is a discriminatory conduct in violation of s. 7 rights of Dr. Verma are actionable aginst CPSBC pursuant to s. 24 of Charter as per the law outlined by Lynn-Smith J, in McClelland et al. v. Dr. Stewart et al., (20 Aug 2003) Vanc. Reg., BCSC 1292 No. S025180, Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto(Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 487 (Gen. Div.) and Finney v. Barreau du Québec, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 17, 2004 SCC 36 for “breach of its obligation to protect the public in the handling of the complaints made against” the physicians. The discrimination regarding the refusal to take disciplinary action aginst the offending members in the instant case also constitutes violation of human rights given that he conduct of the College Human Rights Code.

THAT CPSBC concedes that in lieu of of appealing the penalty malciously imposed by the Council and notwithstanding its being upheld by the biased judges of the Supreme Court of British Columbia as per the order of Mr. Justice Meredith and Low there are grounds for a collateral attack given that the appeals are null on the grounds of grossly ineffective legal counsel, misapplication of law, bias of the judges, failure to follow legal precedents thus violation of principle of universality of application of justice by Mr. Justice Low. This collateral attacks is founded on the tort of prosecutorial misconduct or more precisely abuse of process or misfeasance in public office through conspiring to injure the economic interests of Dr. Verma inflicting upon him extremely serious financial losses that offend s. 7 of Charter, intentional infliction of mental distress resulting in severe clinical depression, disruption of marriage, breach of doctrine of legitimate expectaions etc.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the tort of deprivation of ability to earn a living inthe instant circumstnces amount to wrongful dismissal that has been often combined with malicious prosecution, and the Attorney General of British Columbia can be added as a co-defendant in this tort of wronful covert expropriation without compensation where the estimated damage award would be in the range of twenty million dollars.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the pleadings herein are clearly distinguishable from the plaintiff before Crane J., in Pearson v. Ontario (Attorney General), (3 Mar 2006) CanLII 9977 (ONSC) CFN- 04-13193 at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2006/2006onsc10732.html and do meet the test applied other than the outcome or prosecution not ending in favour of the plaintiff which is not necessary where the tribunal is waived the requirement of nemo judex because the finding of guilt itself being perverse is abuse of the statutory authority for having been done with bias, notwithstanding the finding of lack of bias by the court given that the reviewing judge himself was biased and made numerous errors.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it is vicariously liable for the misconduct of Mr. David Martin, the counsel retained for prosecuting Dr. Verma, where the College perpetrated offences aginst Dr. Verma in the guise of disciplinary hearing the College was in reality engaged in an obstruction or subversion of justice (R. v. Wijesinha, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 422) through relying on tainted evidence, coerced testimoney and later attempted to uphold the illegal orders of the Council through misleading justice via perpetrating fraud on the court and perpetrated an offence against the administration of law and justice through several manners, the most egregious of which is the coercion of Mr. Frasee who was guility of giving contradictory evidence as a witness in the proceedings that offends s. 136, 137 and 139 of the Criminal Code, that provide:

136. (1) Every one who, being a witness in a judicial proceeding, gives evidence with respect to any matter of fact or knowledge and who subsequently, in a judicial proceeding, gives evidence that is contrary to his previous evidence is guilty of an indictable offence . . .

Fabricating evidence

137. Every one who, with intent to mislead, fabricates anything with intent that it shall be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding,

THAT CPSBC concedes if the opportunity to bring this tort actoin is not allowed then, the plaintiff would be left without recourse such that it would offend the doctrine of the ubi jus, ibi remedium principle – where there is a right, there is a remedy as outlined by Sharpe J.A., in Freeman-Maloy v. Marsden,(31 Mar 2006) CanLII 9693 (ONCA) CFN-C43539 at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2006/2006onca10227.html as follows at para 22:

[22] In several cases, misfeasance in a public office claims have been allowed against statutory officers who enjoy considerable independence from the direction of government. Three Rivers, supra, involved a claim against officers of the Bank of England. McGillivray v. Kimber (1915), 52 S.C.R. 146 involved a claim against a quasi-judicial pilotage authority for the improper revocation of a pilot’s licence. Gershman v. Manitoba Vegetable Producers’ Marketing Board (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 114 (Man. C.A.) involved a claim against a provincial marketing board. Shuchuk v. Wolfert 2001 ABQB 937 (CanLII) </ab/cas/abqb/2001/2001abqb937.html>, (2001), 98 Alta. L.R. (3d) 346 (Q.B.), affd. 2003 ABCA 109 (CanLII) </ab/cas/abca/2003/2003abca109.html>, (2003), 15 Alta. L.R. (4th) 5 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 195, allowed a claim for misfeasance in a public office to proceed against the Workers’ Compensation Board. Dechant v. Stevens 2001 ABCA 39 (CanLII) </ab/cas/abca/2001/2001abca39.html>, (2001), 89 Alta. L.R. (3d) 246 (C.A.) allowed a claim for misfeasance in a public office to proceed against the Law Society of Alberta. The seminal case Ashby v. White (1703), 2 Raym. Ld. 938, 92 E.R. 126 involved a claim against a returning officer. The absence of effective governmental control was one of the reasons for allowing the claim: “To allow this action will make public officers more careful to observe the constitution of cities and boroughs, and not to be so partial as they commonly are in all elections, which is indeed a great and growing mischief, and tends to the prejudice of the peace of the nation” (per Lord Holt at 956).

THAT CPSBC concedes that proceedings undertaken by the College regarding Dr. Verma given that the jurisdiction was lost at pre-inquiry stage through unlawful acts during the investigation as per the law explained by Cory J. in Canada (Attorney general) v. Public service alliance of Canada, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 941, 1993 CanLII 125 (S.C.C.) (1993), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 673; (1993), 11 Admin. L.R. (2d) 59 who concluded upon citing Beetz J., in U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, 1988 CanLII 30 (S.C.C.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048, that “on the question of its jurisdiction to entertain the complaint put before it, if the Board made a simple error it has exceeded its jurisdiction”

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College inspectors were in breach of their duty to act fairly (Re Pergamon Press Ltd. [1971] 1 Ch. 388 at 399, [1970] 3 WLR 792 [1970] 3 All E.R. 535 (C.A.) which mandate that they should not only be impartial, but should appear to be impartial. As explained after citing Ferguson v. Imax Systems Corporation (1984) 52 CBR (NS) 255 (Ont Div Crt) by Hood J., in Grebely v. Seven Mile High Group Inc., (8 May 1990) BCSC ,Vanc. Reg., No.A900448 , .[1990] 46 B.C.L.R. (2d) 240 (S.C.B.C.) at page 258. at http://www.canlii.org/bc/cas/bcsc/1990/1990bcsc10548.html , and also stating that Lord Parker C.J.wrote in Re H.K. (An Infant) -generally while at the same time I agree with the observations of Woolf J. in Perestrello, specifically. While the inspector must be impartial or unbiased the rules applicable to one performing a normal judicial or quasi-judicial role. And stated as follows at para 59:

[59] It seems to me that [investigator] can discharge his duty to be fair and impartial by making sure that he interviews any person who may be adversely affected by his investigation and report, for example Hamelin, and making sure that that person is made aware of the allegations about or against him and that he is given a reasonable opportunity to correct or contradict the allegations. If [investigator's] conduct is to be attacked on the basis of bias, particularly at this stage, then in my opinion in order to succeed ][accused applicant] must establish actual operative bias on the part of [investigator]. Proof of a reasonable apprehension of bias would not be enough.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it was acting without jurisdiction given that the matters investigated were not the legislative intent behind the constituting statute i .e. Medical Practitioners Act R.S.B.C. 1996 c 285. It is untenable to presume that the purpose of the statute creating the tribunal was to investigating fraudulent billings made on behalf of non-existant patients was assigned to the College, and thst such investigations and prosecutions are the reason for its existence of the College, or that College is possessed with any expertise that the police and the courts do not have and there is nothing in the nature of the problem that could not be dealt with the MSP reviewers or the courts such that the College was a proper forum to investigate that issue. This abuse of statutory authority by the College being consistent with views of Iacobucci J., in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 157, 1995 CanLII 148 (S.C.C.) (1995), 121 D.L.R. (4th) 385; (1995), 27 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1

[30] In distinguishing jurisdictional questions from questions of law within a tribunal's jurisdiction, this Court has eschewed a formalistic approach. Rather, it has endorsed a "pragmatic and functional analysis", to use the words of Beetz J. in U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, 1988 CanLII 30 (S.C.C.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048. In that decision, Beetz J. noted, at p. 1088, that it was relevant for the reviewing court to examine:

. . . not only the wording of the enactment conferring jurisdiction on the administrative tribunal, but the purpose of the statute creating the tribunal, the reason for its existence, the area of expertise of its members and the nature of the problem before the tribunal.

The goal is to determine whether the legislature intended that the question in issue be ultimately decided by the tribunal, or rather by the courts.

THAT the decision of CPSBC to refer Dr. Verma to the Inquiry Committee as the very first step in the prosecution was unconstitutional, malicious and abuse of the statutory authority as outlined by Hawco J.C.Q.B.A. in Heslop v. Alberta, (17 Mar 2006) ABQB 203 Calgary Reg. (CanLII) CFN- 0401 18543 at http://canlii.org/ab/cas/abqb/2006/2006abqb203.htmlgiven that it was based on “impermissible speculation” and a breach of doctrine of presumption of innocence, enshrined in s. 11(d) of the Charter. that applies by analogy despite the proceedings being administrative becuase the nature of the allegations was quasi-criminal and there is an obligation on all statutory bodies to conform to the Charter principles. The Conduct of the proceedings was undoubtely motivated by a presumption of guilt and presmption of absence of an innocent explanation, the opportunity to consider which was not only maliciously denied in breach of doctrine of legitimate expectations and dealing with Dr. Verma in a manner that egregiously breaching doctrine of legitimate expectations as outlined by Phelan J., in Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), (8 June 2006) FC 727 (CanLII) CFN- T-937-04 upon citing at para 61 the authority of Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (S.C.C.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, [1999] S.C.J No. 39 (QL), by not acting consistently (per McLachlin C.J. in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650, 2004 SCC 48 (CanLII) (2004), 241 D.L.R. (4th) 83; (2004), 121 C.R.R. (2d) 261; (2004), 17 Admin. L.R. (4th) 165 as explained by Cyr J., in Holt v. Bathurst (City), (14 June 2006) NBQB 210 (CanLII) CFN- B/M/88/05). The College havin acted discriminatingly and contrary to ss. 7, 15(1), 24, 36(1) and s. 52 of the Constitution Act 1982 via not sending the complaint to the accused physician to respond before proceeding further (per Vertes J.S.C. in Tanaka v. Certified General Accountants' Assn. (Northwest Territories), (2 Apr 1996) NTSC CV06318 posted at CanlII at http://www.canlii.org/nt/cas/ntsc/1996/1996ntsc10046.html, per Esson, C.J.S.C. (as he then was) in R. (J.) v. College of Psychologists of British Columbia, (17 Nov 1993), Vancouver Registry, BCSC A933649 and H. W. R. Wade in Administrative Law , 6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at pages 570-571 )

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College breached the duty of candor by failing to disclose that the Registrar owed a duty of fairness to Dr. Verma as was done for Dr. Short during the preliminary investigative stage, as done before Clancy J., in Short v. The College of Dental Surgeons of British Columbia, ( 25 Sep 2000) BCSC 1410 ,Vanc. Reg., No. A982911 as following at para 25. It is a reasonable conclusion that the exclusion of the accused physician from participating in the pre-hearing stages by the College gives rise to a reaonable apprehension of bias given that such conduct is inexorable evidene of a “presumption of guilt” which is in a breach of the high duty of fairness mandated by law.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the proceedings were tained by unfairness that would inevitably lead to loss of jurisdiction to discipline given the violation of the cardinal principles of the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial. The principles of fundamental justice and the requirements of s. 11(d) are "inextricably intertwined": see R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 at p. 603, 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Cory J., for the majority in R. v. Rose (1998), 129 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.), at para. 95)

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College is vicariously liable for prosecuting Dr. Verma maliciously through relying on tainted evidence adduced that was fruit of criminal acts of the college investigators who traspassed, invaded priavcy of Dr. Verma and the patients, knowingly circumvented the statutory provisions of the Medical Practitioners Act where the invesigators and the prosecutor Mr. David Martin fabricated, forged, tempered with, or supressed evidence and recklessly undermined the fairness of proceedings by coercing the witnesses under threat of criminal prosecution and discontinuation of methatdone treetement compelling him to testify contrary to his previous testimony by conselling him offence. acting as a “person causing events to happen” pursuant to s. 429 of the Criminal Code, and “person counselling offence” as defined in s. 22(1) of the Code that provides:

22. (1) Where a person counsels another person to be a party to an offence and that other person is afterwards a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party to that offence, notwithstanding that the offence was committed in a way different from that which was counselled.

THAT CPSBC concedes that in light of the fact that the mental capacity of Dr. Verma was in issue the college acted without jurisdiction through admitting uncorroborated evidence in his prosecution and sentencing that offends the Evidence Act RSBC 1996 c 124 that defines the witness as follows

4(1) In this section, "witness" includes any person who testifies in the course of any proceedings authorized by law.

4 (2) A witness must not be excused from answering a question or producing a document on the ground that the answer or the document may tend to incriminate the witness or any other person, or may tend to establish his or her liability to a civil proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of any person or to a prosecution under any Act.

s. 4(3) If a witness objects to answering a question on any of the grounds referred to in subsection (2), and if, but for this section or any Act of Canada, the witness would have been excused from answering the question, then, although the witness is by reason of this section or by reason of any Act of Canada compelled to answer, the answer given must not be used or receivable in evidence against that witness in any civil proceeding or in any proceeding under any Act.

THAT CPSBC concedes that through fraudulently and coercively obtaining medical charts from Dr. Verma to which Dr. Verma objected, given that the search and seizure was done without lawful authority, the college was precluded from adducing those records into the proceedings such that there is no evidence before the Committee such that the findings made are patently unreasonable and tainted with malice and fraud. ( Sopinka J., in Canada (Attorney General) v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 614, 1991 CanLII 88 (S.C.C.) (1991), 80 D.L.R. (4th) 520; [1991] 48 Admin. L.R. 161)

THAT CPSBC concedes that College prosecutor acted illegally through attempting to generate evidecne and testimony to negate the prior spontaneouly made utterances of the complainant such that credibility of own statments of the complainant were in issued as per the law accepted by Sopinka J., in R. v. Evans, (Clive Douglas), (21 Oct 1993) 3 S.C.R. 653M [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653 that an admission is an exception to the hearsay rule. “Its admissibility rests on the theory of the adversary system that what a party has previously stated can be admitted against the party in whose mouth it does not lie to complain of the unreliability of his or her own statements.” We need not resolve this debate since under either view an admission is admissible. [D.M. Paciocco and L.Stuesser addressed this point in The Law of Evidence (Concord: Irwin Law, 1996) at pp. 85-86] It was clear abuse of the process to compel the witness Mr. Frazee to admit to unreliabiliyt of his own prior statements.

THAT via declining the sought adjournment to Dr. Verma, who was known to be suffering from depression during the proceedings, CPSBC through surpressing the evidence of his ill-health, denying an adjournment for recieving treatment offended s. 7, 36(1) of s. 52 of The Constitution Act 1982 and further offended the overriding priciple that “fair hearing must be the paramount consideration” (Re Morgan and Association of Ontario Land Surveyors (1980), 28 O.R. (2d) 19 (Div. Ct.) at p. 3 ) as noted by Carnwath J., for the panel of ONSCDC in Howatt v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, (21 Jan 2003) ONSCDC No. 720-2000 as follows at para 33:

[33] The law is clear that an adjournment should be granted when a party is prevented by illness from attending a hearing. In the context of a professional disciplinary hearing in particular, it is fundamental that the member who seeks an adjournment because of illness be afforded the opportunity to be present at a hearing and to make his defence. A tribunal should only deny the member that opportunity in the clearest of cases. Kampman v. Canada (1993), F.C.J. No. 66 (C.A.); Olech v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1994] O.J. No. 520 (Div. Ct.), at para. 6; and, P.I.S. v. M.S., [1993] B.C.J. No. 2220 (B.C.S.C.)

THAT via declining to consent to the adjourment the College unlawfully interfered with the right to contact and retain counsel constitute serious enough prosecutorial misocnduct that was permitted to proceed to trial by Hawco J.C.Q.B.A. in Heslop v. Alberta, (17 Mar 2006) ABQB 203 Calgary Reg. (CanLII) CFN- 0401 18543.

THAT via offending s. 7, 8 and 15(1) of Charter, the disposition of the College proceedings is fraudulent for being patently unreasonable given that there was no addmissible evidence, before the college to render the disposition and the sentence imposed given that both were arbitrarily and abused statutory authority. The proceedings of the Inquiry Committee were unconstitutional for offence to the rule that “[t]he right to silence, which has been recognized as a principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is based on society's distaste for compelling a person to incriminate him- or herself with his or her own words” (R. v. Noble, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 874, 1997 CanLII 388 (S.C.C.) (1997), 146 D.L.R. (4^th)) . The evidence adduced is tainted because of failure to inform the member physician as a witness of his or her right to object under s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act. A right against self-incrimination is meaningless if the individual is not properly advised of that right as is done in the criminal context in the Miranda warning proper procedure was not adhered to during the admission of the presumed "voluntary confession" of some allegations that constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule in the context of ‘threshold reliability’ as outlined by Menzies J., in Q v Bridges, (16 May 2005) MBQB 118 (CanLII) CFN- CR04.02.00441 after citing Doherty J. A. in R. v. Foreman 2002 CanLII 6305 (ON C.A.), [2002] O. J. No. 4332, 62 O. R. (3d) 204 (Ont. C. A.) at para. 37 and Charron J. A. (as she then was at para. 58, in R. v. Moore-McFarlane 2001 CanLII 6363 (ON C.A.), (2001) 56 O. R. (3d) 737. "that it is up to the state, with its greater resources, to investigate and prove its own case, and that the individual should not be conscripted into helping the state fulfill this task" as cautioned by Lamer C. J., in R. v. P. (M.B.), 1994 CanLII 125 (S.C.C.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.), at p.579. This rule applied given that the College has neither given a notice of nor made out a case regarding the threats issued to the complainant Frazee by the member such that the College has no right to inquire that from Dr. Verma nor was the presumption of admitted guilt admissible. There is breach of the rule that prosecution must establish a "case to meet" before there can be any expectation that the accused should respond

“[a] party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of oath” (Morgan, “Basic Problems of Evidence” (1963), pp. 265-66, quoted in McCormick on Evidence, at p. 140). Given that College relied largely on evidence supplied largely by Dr. Verma in the form of the Charter of the complinants and through testifying (derivative) evidence that the College was under a duty to advise Dr. Verma as to not an obligation which he, being self-reprsented (given that adjournment to retain counsel was denied) misunderstood he was under obligation to testify there was no lawfully aduced evidence before the committee. The confession regarding the thrats to the life of the complainant posted in front of Dr. Verma's office was fraudulently and unconstitutionally admitted.

THAT CPSBC concedes that there was no lawfully obtained evidence before the committee to render the verdict that was rendered or the imposition of the penaltiy as done as per the law stated by Quigley J. in Marsden v. Taylor, (2 Oct 2006) CanLII 34214 (ONSC) CFN-4880-05 at http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2006/2006onsc16298.html at para 40 noted that - “Unreasonability requires that there have been no evidence to support the decision reached by the Board: Griffen v. Teplitsky, [1999] O.J. No. 1552 (S.C.J.) at para 13”.

THAT CPSBC concedes that even if Dr. Verma did not object to release of the Charter or to resopnd to the questions asked of him that would incriminate him, he is to be assued to have objected given the law that a witness at an inquest shall be deemed to have objected to answer any question asked him upon the ground that his answer may tend to criminate him or may tend to establish his liability to civil proceedings at the instance of the Crown, (per Isaac L.J.S.C. in Caron v. Chodan Estate, [1989] O.J. No. 3041 (H.C.).)

9. (1) A witness at an inquiry shall be deemed to have objected to answer any question asked him upon the ground that his answer may tend to criminate him or may tend to establish his liability to civil proceedings at the instance of the Crown or any other person, and no answer given by a witness at an inquiry shall be used or be receivable in evidence against him in any trial or other proceedings against him thereafter taking place, other than a prosecution for perjury in giving such evidence. (Starr v. Houlden, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1366)

THAT CPSBC concedes that only in criminal proceedings may records divulged to police without patient's consent by physi­cians and hospital employees (Sol. Gen. Can. et al. v. Roy. Comm. (Health Records), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 494, 1981 CanLII 33 (S.C.C.)) and that the College is without power to have access to them without the written consent of the patients such that the investigators breached the privacy rights of the patients rendering the records inadmissible for brech of the Privacy Act.The evidence before the College was furtehr tainted because the unrepresented accused member of the College could not be called by the Crown to give evidence against himself and to answer to the evidence obtained without lawful authority through trespass,. Charter breaches, and invasion of privacy. This is so becuase the entery of the College investigators into the clinic was for an alien, unlawful, purpose and furtherance of his unlawful purpose thus they engaged in contradictory activity admonisehd in R. v. Born With A Tooth, 1992 CanLII 2824 (ABCA) (4 Sep 1992), 76 C.C.C. (3d) 169; (1992), [1993] 3 C.N.L.R. 163; (1992), 4 Alta. L.R. (3d) 289 CFN-12492 at para 39 as follows:

[39] A nice question arises if the victim has the right to go on the land for one purpose, but goes on in fact for another, unlawful, purpose. A water-meter inspector has a right of entry for one limited purpose. If she in fact enters to steal the refrigerator, and an irate homeowner who knows her true pur­pose ejects her, can the accused owner invoke s. 41 and say that the inspector was a trespasser? Some authorities seem to sug­gest an affirmative answer. See R. v. Collins, [1973] 1 Q.B. 100 (C.A.), and R. v. Jones, [1976] 3 All E.R. 54; [1976] 1 W.L.R. 672 (C.A.), and R. v. Walkington, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1169; [1979] 2 All E.R. 716; [1979] Crim. L.R. 526; 123 S.J. 704; 68 Cr. App. R. 427 (CA.). And see two Ontario cases, R. v. Doucette, [1960] O.R. 407 (C.A.), and R. v. Antley (1963), 42 C.R. 384 (Ont. CA.). But see the criticism by Glanville Williams, Textbook of Crimi­nal Law (2nd Ed.) (London: Stevens & Son, 1983), at 847-850, albeit in the context of what amounts to proof of an element of the offence of breaking and entering. This court, in R. v. Farbridge,,[1985] 2 W.W.R. 56; 57 A.R. 292; 15 C.C.C.(3d) 521; 42 C.R.(3d) 385; 34 Alta. L.R.(2d) 394 (C.A.), accepted the criticism, and took a narrower view. We held that a person who enters lawfully does not become a trespasser unless and until he does something in furtherance of his unlaw­ful purpose. Thus, in the example given, the homeowner might not be able to eject the meter inspector until she reaches for the refrigerator, or turns away from the path to the meter. But that contradictory activity might well arise before actual entry, as when the inspector is seen coming up the front walk pushing a large refrigerator dolly.

THAT CPSBC concedes that applicability of law that a witness at an oral, telephonic or electronic hearing shall be deemed to have objected to answer any question asked him is a generally applicable law in all inquries and by necessary implication applied to the College proceedings as is noted in in Education Staff Regulations, s. 9 of N.W.T. Reg. 170-96, s. 9.(1) Public Inquiries Act, R.S.O. 1980, s. 42(1) of the Coroners Act, c. 411, Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 at s. 14.(1) given that the silence on this is to be interpreted as implying its applicability given that Iaccobucci J. writing for the Court in R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 (CanLII), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, 2001 SCC 56 at para. 30. Not only is legislation from the same jurisdiction relevant, so too are related statutes from other jurisdictions.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College is vicariously liable for the misconduct of Mr. David Martin who acting as a “person counselling offence” was engaged in theft of the asset of lifetime earning ability with the “animus furandi” complete with all four elements: (i) fraudulently, (ii) without a claim of right made in good faith, (iii) with intent at the time of taking, (iv) permanently to deprive the owner.

THAT CPSBC concedes that claims for damages for malicious prosecution are not circumscribed by the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, as clarified after citing Al’s Steak House and Tavern Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, [1997] O.J. No. 3046 (C.A.) by Sheppard J., in Ferri v. Root, (26 Feb 2006) CanLII 5304 (ONSC) CFN-11471/00; 14882/03 at at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2006/2006onsc10412.html

THAT CPSBC concedes that claim of Dr. Verma against the College meets the pleading test for malicious prosecution outined by Perell, J. in Grant v. Toronto Police Services Board, (30 Aug 2005) CanLII 30854 (ONSC) CFN-03-CV-247156 CM3 at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2005/2005onsc14467.html as follows at para 14:

[14] There are four elements to a claim of malicious prosecution: (1) the proceeding must have been initiated by the defendant; (2) the proceedings must have been terminated in favour of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have shown to have prosecuted without reasonable and probable cause; and (4) the defendant must have been motivated by malice or a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect. See: Nelles v. Ontario, 1989 CanLII 77 (S.C.C.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; Proulx v. The Attorney General of Quebec, 2001 SCC 66 (CanLII), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9; Wilson v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Service, [2001] O.J. No. 2434 (S.C.J.), aff’d. [2002] O.J. No. 383 (C.A.); Aristocrat Restaurants Ltd. (c.o.b. Tony’s East) v. Ontario, [2003] O.J. No. 5331 (S.C.J).

THAT CPSBC concedes the modern tort law regarding malicious prosecution as noted in Jackson v. Canada (Attorney General), (18 Sep 2006) CanLII 32311 (ONCA) recommends that the Nelles test is not to be applied strictly, as previously outlined in Folland v. Ontario 2003 CanLII 52139 (ONCA), (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 89 (C.A.); (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 50;and the fact that Dunn J., tried a case of malicious prosecution despite a conviction, that has not yet been appealed, in King v. Ontario (Attorney General), (6 Feb 2006) CanLII 2893 (ONSC) CFN-01-BN-1316;02-BN-962 http://canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2006/2006onsc10266.html This is because of additional components in the pleadings of breach of right of trial, incompetent counsel , engaging in random surveillance, invasion of privacy, breach of constituting statute during prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of mental suffering, injurious falsehood, intentional infliction of mental suffering, trespass, non-consensual contact by investigators, invasion of privacy during investigation, reliance on derivative evidence, Charter breaches and tainted evidence, all of which are exception to the arm of test requiring an acquittal given that the conviction is false, and the Nelles test does not directly apply.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the proceedings against Dr. Verma were tainted with admission of illegally obtained evidence given the violation of the right he was entitled to one of protection “from being indirectly compelled to incriminate themselves” that applied by analogy to the s. 13 Charter rights R. v. Henry, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, 2005 SCC 76 given that all laws must conform to Charter values.

THAT CPSBC concedes the modern tort law regarding malicious prosecution as noted by Weiler J.A, who has stressed the need for evolution of tort law about the role of malice in actions against prosecutors ought to allow the plaintiff some flexibility, as outlined in Folland v. Ontario 2003 CanLII 52139 (ONCA), (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 89 (C.A.); (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 50; leave to appeal refused [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 249 (S.C.C.) as follows at paras 10, 20 and 21:

[10] As indicated by the motions judge, before a cause of action in a statement of claim can be struck out it must be "plain and obvious" that no cause of action is disclosed: Hunt v. Carey Canada inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959. Applying Hunt, supra, this court has held that the burden on a defendant to strike a claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action is very high, and the court's power to do so should be exercised "only in the clearest cases": Temilini v. Ontario Provincial Police (Commissioner) (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 664 (C.A.). For this reason the facts alleged in the statement of claim are accepted as proven unless they are patently ridiculous or incapable of proof and the statement of claim is read generously with allowance for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies: Nash v. Ontario (1995), 27 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.). The novelty of a cause of action is of no concern: Johnson v. Adamson (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 236 (C.A.) [Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 64n].

[20] The appellants rely upon Milgaard v. Kujawa (1994), 118 D.L.R. (4th) 653 (Sask. C.A.) at 662-664 in which the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal suggested that the categories of tort available against prosecutors were not closed and that the torts of abuse of statutory power and conspiracy to abuse statutory power might exist if actuated by malice or other improper motive.

[21] In addition in R. v. Cook (1997), 146 D.L.R. (4th) 437 (S.C.C.) at 445-446, L'Heureux Dubé J., on behalf of the Court, affirmed, albeit in a criminal context, that the improper exercise of prosecutorial discretion can result in a finding of abuse of process. She added, "This misconduct can take many forms, and will often engage the rights set out in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, although the exact manner in which this occurs will depend on the particular circumstances in the case: R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 103 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235." A plaintiff in an abuse of process action does not need to show that the proceedings terminated in his or her favour: Geo. Cluthe Manufacturing Co. v. ZTW Properties Inc. (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 370 at 379 (Div. Ct.).

THAT CPSBC concedes the plaintiff Dr. Verma is lawfully and reasonably permitted to plead a lack of “reasonable and probable cause” stated in R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 240 at 250-251 and previously defined as "an honest belief in the guilt of the accused “ in Hicks v. Faulkner (1878), 8 Q.B.D. 167, at p. 171, Hawkins J., given that the College was operating under a presumption of guilt and based its decision to refer Dr. Verma to the inquiry committee, without any notice of the complaint. A balancing of the statements of all relevant witnesses including input from Dr. Verma would be mandatory for any reasonable prosecutor to develop an honest belief in the guilt of the accused physician. Furthermore, the college was aiding other physicians “gain a private collateral advantage” by putting Dr. Verma out of practice. The charade of disciplinary proceedings was motivated by sinister ulterior motives and had nothing to do with the proper disciplianry process for which the statutory power is granted to the College.

THAT CPSBC concedes that in support of maliciout prosecution by the College, the court is permitted to completley ignore the outcome of the proceedings before the College and the disposition of the reviews by Meredith J., and Low J., given that all three are tainted with bias such that a “certiorari should issue ex debito justitiae where there was a denial of natural justice”. (Harelkin v. University of Regina, 1979 CanLII 18 (S.C.C.), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 561, and Homex Realty and Development Co. v. Corporation of the Village of Wyoming, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 1011, Immeubles port louis ltée v. Lafontaine (Village), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 326, 1991 CanLII 82 (S.C.C.) (1991), 78 D.L.R. (4th) 175). Both of the judges having acted wihtout jurisdiction throuhg failing to notice the numeerous errors by the Inquiry Committe such that those jurisdictional questions did “ result in the entire decision of the tribunal being set aside”. (per Iacobucci J. in CBC v. Canada (LRB), 1995 CanLII 148 (S.C.C.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 157 at pp. 178-79,)

THAT CPSBC concedes that the presence of the statutory right of appeal obviates the need to find a jurisdictional error. (Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, 1997 CanLII 385 (S.C.C.) (1997), 144 D.L.R. (4th) 1; (1997), 50 Admin. L.R. (2d) 199)

“The patently unreasonable interpretation rule applies only to errors which an administrative tribunal may have made in deciding a question considered as falling within the limits of its jurisdiction. The rule does not apply to a jurisdictional error.” (Beetz J., in Syndicat des employés de production du Québec v. CLRB, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412, 1984 CanLII 26 (S.C.C.) (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 457; (1984), [1985] 14 Admin. L.R. 72)

THAT CPSBC concedes that Meredith J., and Low J., seriously and fatally erred in law through fettering jurisdiction by adopting an overly deferential posture through misapplication of law of Judicial Review to the statutory appeal and failing to appraise of the correct law that appeals are not judicial reviews (C.U.P.E. v. N.B. Liquor Corp., 1979 CanLII 23 (S.C.C.), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227 at 233, 97 D.L.R. (3d) 417). Jones and deVillars, Principles of Administrative Law (1985), at page 339: The "patently unreasonable" test has no application in the context of statutory appeals on "law or jurisdiction". In the first place, the legislature has granted an appeal from all errors of law, not just those which are patently unreasonable.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College deceitfully misled and corrupted the judges through not persuading them that the principle of deference is not automatic. It is well settled that, despite a generally deferential stance, courts will intervene in the face of a jurisdictional error, or a patently unreasonable error of fact or law (Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, 1993 CanLII 164 (S.C.C.)(1993), 100 D.L.R. (4th) 658; (1993), 13 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1). And through deterring the court to apply the functional and pragmatic analys, threshold of evidence and other legal princiles which offended the rule of "court's duty to determine the law in every case" as noted by Hinkson J. A., in Yukon (Human Rights Commission) v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, Dawson Lodge #1, 1993 CanLII 3415 (YKCA) (9 Mar 1993), 100 D.L.R. (4th) 596; (1993), 18 C.H.R.R. 347; (1993), 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) 14 aff'd Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 571. The duty of fairness required that the College prosecutor lay the fact and law fairly and objectively before the court and not act with vindictiveness. Notwithstanding that, in being biasedly overzealous in his prosecution the Counsel for the College recklessly neglected the priciple that prohibits aggressive prosecution as emphasized by the Supreme Court of Canada in many jugments on the issue of abuse of process. Slatter J., in Robertson v. Edmonton (City) Police Service (#10), (6 Jul 2004) ABQB 519 No. 0103 16123 as following at para 171

[171] . . .a prosecutor should not proceed unless he or she is satisfied there is a reasonable prospect of conviction. A prosecutor (at least in a criminal case) is expected to be objective, and to prevent the case without regard to subjective animosity. But a prosecutor will inevitably have a view about the outcome. As LeBel, J. held in R. v. Regan, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, 2002 SCC 12 at para. 89: As Rand J. made clear in Boucher, v. The Queen, [1955] S.C.R. 16 commitment to the case, belief in the allegations, and the desire to see justice done are not incompatible with objectivity and fairness.

THAT CPSBC concedes that fettering of jurisdiction by Meredith J., and Low J., renders their orders nullities given the offence to the rule that has been stated in these words : “on a review of the authorities it is clear that all boards, are subject to the jurisdictional supervision of the Superior Court” (Estey J., dissenting in part, in Douglas Aircraft Co. of Canada v. McConnell, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245). And by Lamer C.J., in TWU v. British Columbia Telephone Co., (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 385; [1988] 2 S.C.R. 564, 1988 CanLII 14 (S.C.C.)

[49] In Syndicat des employés de production du Québec et de l'Acadie v. Canada Labour Relations Board, 1984 CanLII 26 (S.C.C.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 412, Beetz J. explained jurisdictional error in these terms, at pp. 420-21: A jurisdictional error results generally in an excess of jurisdiction or a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, whether at the start of the hearing, during it, in the findings or in the order disposing of the matter. Such an error, even if committed in the best possible good faith, will result nonetheless in the decision containing it being set aside.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the action against it woudl succeed if based on (a) breach of fiduciary duty by proceedings when the member is mentally disabled, (b) negligent investigation, (c) unlawful interference with economic relations, (d) abuse of public office, (e) intentional infliction of mental distress, and (f) injurious falsehood/defamation. (g) negligent or malicious prosecution; (h) administrative law breach via porsecuting criminal matter under administrative law; (i) wrongful prosecution, (j) malfeasance of public office, (k) breach of the Charter; (l) damage to reputation (m) unfair treatment (n) injurious falsehood (o breach of duty of care and (p) conspiracy such that the pleadings contained in this document are sufficent as per the test outlined by Blair J., in Strauss v. Jarvis et al, (28 Apr 2006) Kamloops Reg. BCSC 675 (CanLII) CFN-34683 at http://canlii.org/bc/cas/bcsc/2006/2006bcsc675.html

THAT CPSBC admits that in proceedings against Dr. Verma it can be said that "Such abuses may occur when zealous civil servants over-step their authority for what they believe is the best interests of the public without due regard for individuals consequently harmed, or when executive decisions are made which bend the rule and injure a few to avoid politically undesirable consequences." as concluded in Alberta (Minister of Public Works, Supply and Services) v. Nilsson, 1999 ABQB 440 (CanLII), 1999 ABQB 440 (CanLII); 1999 ABQB 440 (CanLII), [1999] 9 W.W.R. 203; (1999), 70 Alta. L.R. (3d) 267 on citing Three Rivers District Council and Others v. Bank of England (No. 3), [1996] 3 All E.R. 558 (QB) both of which which are well recognized authority for the tort of misfeasance in public office, and cited in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69

THAT CPSBC concedes that fettering of jurisdiction by Meredith J., and Low J., renders their orders nullities given the offence to the rule which dictates that “Canadian law recognizes that a denial of natural justice goes to jurisdiction” (see Alliance des Professeurs catholiques de Montréal v. Labour Relations Board of Quebec 1953 CanLII 2 (C.S.C.), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140. per Laskin C. J., in Forsythe v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 268) such that a denial of natural justice is always a jurisdictional error and that refusing adjournment to obtain legal assistance and medical attention to Dr. Verma did constitute a clear and fatal jurisdictional error that was willfully ignored by both Meredith J., and Low J., who acted in sufficient bad faith to have acted in a fashion that is actionable per se.

THAT CPSBC concedes jurisdictional los thorugh procedural unfairness through insufficient notice, through levelling new allegations constantly throughout the hearing before the panel, resulint in denial of a proper oopportunity to Dr. Verma to state his defence in a very serious violaiton of the law stated by Dickson C.J., in MacDonald v. City of Montreal, (1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 321; [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, 1986 CanLII 65 (S.C.C.)

[193] Furthermore, although it has not been necessary for the purpose of this case to address the issue raised by the appellant from the point of view of due process, there are evident parallels between what I have articulated as the core value protected by s. 133 and the guarantees of fairness accorded by common law natural justice, s. 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights and s. 7 of the Charter. It could be argued that s. 133, by requiring notice of judicial proceedings in whichever of the two official languages the recipient speaks, provides an extra dimension to the analysis of the adequacy of notice under those various doctrines and instruments. In addition, because of its constitutional stature, s. 133 also reinforces the tendency of the courts to treat breaches of procedural fairness as amounting to jurisdictional error. Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 (H.L.), stated at p. 80: Time and again in the cases I have cited it has been stated that a decision given without regard to the principles of natural justice is void.... I see no reason to doubt these authorities. The body with the power to decide cannot lawfully proceed to make a decision until it has afforded to the person affected a proper opportunity to state his case.

THAT CPSBC concedes besides malicious prosecution the College is also guility of negligent investigation. The tort of negligent investigation which is analogues to the medical malpractice and incompetent legal representation etc. (see: Beckstead v. Ottawa (City) Chief of Police (1997), 37 O.R. (3d) 62 per Binks J.; Garrett v. Attorney-General, [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 332 per Blanchard J., at p. 344; Northern Territory of Australia v. Mengel (1995), 129 A.L.R. 1 (H.C.), per Brennan J. at p. 25; Henly v. Mayor of Lyme (1828), 5 Bing 91, 130 E.R. 995, Fiset v. Toronto Police Services Board, (20 Dec 2001) ONCA C-35717; Folland v. Ontario, (27 Mar 2003) ONCA C38528; Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, (26 Sep 2005) CanLII 34230 (ONCA)(2005), 259 D.L.R. (4th) 676 , Archibald J., in his article ‘The Widening Net of Liability for Police and Public Officials in the Investigation of Crimes’ found in Annual Review of Civil Litigation 2001 stated the following at page 16 wrote “The tort of negligent investigation is similar to the tort of malicious prosecution, but does not require proof of malice.” This tort is supportable through allegation that the College did not exercise “reasonable care and skill” in carrying out the investigation and failed to contact several pertinent witnesses incuding Dr. Verma as per the standard procedural guarantee of fairenss allowed by the doctrine of legitimate expetation during the investigation and pre-trial stage of the proceeding given that it is evident that the bypassing of the pre-trial steps was malicious and aimed at circuventing procedural fairness and statutory obligations and to be able to obtain the records without the consent of the patient given that the pleading of the College was absence of a patient such that the requisite consent could not be lawfully secured. This conduct is one of failure to “display indifference and neglect even the rudimentary steps required to establish reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge” as outlined uopn citing cases like Osborne v. Attorney General (Ontario), [1998] O.J. No. 4457 (C.A.), McGillivary v. New Brunswick 1994 CanLII 4465 (NB C.A.), (1994), 116 D.L.R. (4th) 104 (N.B.C.A.), and Calveley v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police, [1989] A.C. 1228 (H.L.). by Hackland J., in Spencer v. Ottawa Police Services Board, 2005 CanLII 8687 (ONSC) (2005), 128 C.R.R. (2d) 361 at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2005/2005onsc13309.html at para 12.

THAT CPSBC concedes that there is have no applicability of Limitation statutes in the instant circumstances because of the law stated in Prete v. Ontario, 1993 CanLII 3386 (ON C.A.), [1993] 16 O.R.(3d) 161. to guard aginst the mischief of the possibility for the state to insulate itself from Charter claims, and In order to insure that injustice is not done (Global Petroleum Corp. v. CBI Industries Inc., 1997 CanLII 9880 (NSCA) (1997), 158 N.S.R. (2d) 203) an award of damages can be made in appropriate circumstances under section 24(1), unhindered by the legal regimes found in ordinary statutes, (Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des employees et employés de services publics Inc, 1996 CanLII 208 (S.C.C.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345).Also see Novak v. Bond, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 808.

THAT CPSBC concedes thatparty obtaining documents or information through the discovery process in litigation is subject to an implied undertaking not to use or permit the same to be used for a collateral or ulterior purpose.. Given that the medical charts were obtained for a review purpose and not purusant to a compalint of which Dr. Verma was advised, the College acted capriciously, unconstitutionally and illegally by using the documents so obtained in prosecuting Dr. Verma in a quasi-criminal proceedings. There is a clear application by necessary implication of the implied undertaking rule to not use, or allow to be used, any documents obtained on discovery for any other purpose than the proper conduct of the action. Home Office v. Harman, [1982] 1 All E.R. 532 (H.L.); [1983] A.C. 280., Sterling v. Sullivan, 2003 SKQB 359 (CanLII), 2003 SKQB 359; 2003 SKQB 359 (CanLII), (2003), 231 D.L.R. (4th) 344; (2003), 236 Sask. R. 148 (Q.B.), Goodman v. Rossi 1995 CanLII 1888 (ON C.A.), (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 359,

THAT CPSBC concedes that college engaged in unlawful intrusion into privacy of Dr. Verma, his clinic staff and his patients, breached the duty of protection of his professional image and breached his right to be let alone and in doing do engaged in the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering that offends the law as noted by Québec Court of Appeal has noted in Syndicat des professionnelles du Centre jeunesse de Québec (CSN) c. Desnoyers, 2005 QCCA 110 (IIJCan) [2005] R.J.Q. 414 as following at para 28 [TRANSLATION]

[28] Louise Potvin relates different viewpoints, expressed in civil and common law doctrine, on the subject of the notion of private life in The person and the protection of his Image (A comparative Study of the Quebec, French Law and of Common English Law), Editions Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 1991. She writes, to the orderlies 156 and 157:

In 1888, Mr. Justice Cooley proposed one of the definitions the more known right to the respect of private life, and the right to be left in quiet ("the right to be let alone") "Quietness means absence of any disruption, physical or psychological, in the life of a person". Professor A.F. Westin underlines, in his pioneering work Privacy and Freedom, that private life includes four physical states and basic psychological: The solitude, the intimacy, the anonymity and the reserve. The right to the respect of private life is to be hold sacred, this is not only to recognize an "existence in every sphere in which one cannot interfere itself without there being invited", but this is also to preserve the right of the individual to the anonymity while opposing itself to disclosure "precise facts on a person". (…)

THAT CPSBC concedes that the panel of the Inquiry Committee committed a jurisdictional error by attempting to inquire into allegations that properly belong in the provincial criminal courts through misinterpreting the statute that the College was authorized to investigate bills rendered against individuals not patients of the accused physician in violation of the law outlined in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, the House of Lords set forth a definition of jurisdictional error that was so broad as to include any question involving the interpretation of a statute. It was held that an error made by a tribunal in the interpretation of its empowering statute would be the basis for a court to overturn its decision on the ground that it had committed a jurisdictional error.

And in Forsythe v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 15 (S.C.C.), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 268, which dealt with the question whether a Magistrate's refusal to allow defence counsel to cross-examine a witness amounted to jurisdictional error Laskin C.J.C. stated at pp. 271-72:

In speaking of lack of jurisdiction, this Court was not referring to lack of initial jurisdiction of a judge or a magistrate to enter upon a preliminary inquiry. This is hardly a likelihood. The concern rather was with the loss of this initial jurisdiction and, in my opinion, the situations in which there can be a loss of jurisdiction in the course of a preliminary inquiry are few indeed. However, jurisdiction will be lost by a magistrate who fails to observe a mandatory provision of the Criminal Code: see Doyle v. The Queen, 1976 IIJCan 11 (C.S.C.), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 597. Canadian law recognizes that a denial of natural justice goes to jurisdiction: see Alliance des Professeurs catholiques de Montréal v. Labour Relations Board of Quebec, 1953 IIJCan 2 (C.S.C.), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the panel was clearly biased for having made up its mind to find Dr. Verma guility extrmely prematurely before admission of all of the evidence as evident from the fact of Dr. Verma was referred to as an 'amoral' individual which also constitutes a procedural error of taking of irrelevant or alien issue into considerations like the religion of the parties, in making decision, this is not only discriminatory, but also a jurisdictional error of law due to the arbitrary discrimination that offends principle of natural justice (see: Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, 2001 SCC 31 (CanLII) (2001), 31 Admin. L.R. (3d) 163; (2001), 31 Admin. L.R. (3e) 163; at para 63). The standard of morality being practiced by Dr. Vema was not a question remitted to the panel to determine and that fact ouhgt not have influenced in rendering an objective decision based solely on the evidence properly admitted whether the allegations contained in the notice served upon Dr. Verma were proved or not.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the documents were obtained for a collateral use in breach of as to the duty of confidentiality of material compelled under audit to build a case for quasi-criminal prosecution. (see Starr v. Houlden, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1366, 1990 and Goodman v. Rossi 1995 CanLII 1888 (ON C.A.), (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 359 (Ont. C.A.) Morden A.C.J.O. (as he then was), by not acting in good faith as required in Doucette v. Wee Watch Day Care Systems Inc., (29 May 2006) BCCA 262 (CanLII) CFN- CA032869 at http://canlii.org/bc/cas/bcca/2006/2006bcca262.html per Kirkpatrick J. A. citing F. v. A Psychiatrist (1984), 54 B.C.L.R. 319 per McEachern C.J.S.C.). The manner of securing them was capricious and geared to circumvent the statutory requirements of ss. 56-57 of the constituting Act, and the documents were used for an "improper purpose” (Alterskye v. Scott [1948] 1 All E.R. 469), or a "collateral object" (Bray on Discovery, 1st ed. (1885), p. 238) or, "otherwise than in the action [review or audit procedure] in which they are disclosed" (Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd. v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1975] Q.B. 613, 621, per Talbot J.) or "for any ulterior or alien purpose." (Riddick v. Thames Board Mills Ltd. [1977] Q.B. 881, 896, per Lord Denning M.R.)

THAT CPSBC concedes that the documents seized by the College investigators without the consent of the patients who made the complaint who were the proper privilege holders amounted to information that the College was not entitled to rely upon given the law stated by Arbour J., for the majority in Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61 (CanLII), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209, Arbour J., for the six-three majority said, at p. 234, para. 24: Therefore, any privileged information acquired by the state without the consent of the privilege holder is information that the state is not entitled to as a rule of fundamental justice. This maneovering was additionally unlawful for being decitful and not mere inadvertance given that the the College was aware from the nature of the complaint that consent to release the Charts by the complainants could not have been granted while alleging not to be patients of Dr. Verma.

THAT CPSBC concedes that council or the executive committee acted in excess of jurisdiction by raising the matter of fitness to practise based on a single complaint of a conduct and operated under a presumption that such conduct was probably being practiced as a pattern without gathering any evidence to demonstrate that which offends the s. 53(1) that provides:

53 (1) The council or the executive committee may, and if requested in writing by 3 members in good standing of the college must, cause an inquiry committee to inquire into a charge or complaint made against a member of the college or into a question concerning the conduct, mental condition, capability or fitness to practise of any member of the college.

THAT CPSBC concedes that its jurisdiction was lost by failing to conform to the constituting staute which offended the law stated in Stolen v. College of Teachers (British Columbia)12 B.C.L.R. (3D) 325 (B.C.C.A.) at 336, "where a statutory body is endowed with disciplinary powers, the exercise of those powers must fall clearly within the legislative grant." Where a disciplinary or investigatory power is given by the Act or by-laws to a particular body, or where a particular form of process is specified in the Act or by-laws, the terms of the Act or the by-laws must be complied with strictly, see Ross v. B.C. Psychological Association[1987] 19 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145 (B.C.C.A.).

THAT CPSBC concedes that the documents seized by the College investigators without the mandatory provision of the enabling statute that ought to be strictly complied with by the College to retain jurisdiction, was also not mere advertance by a malicious step in the furtherance of conspiracy given that there was no reasonable likelihood that the Court would have permitted the seizure of the Charts of non-patients, which could only be done pursuant to ss. 56-57 of the Medical Practitioners Act that provide:

Search and seizure under court order

56 (1) A person authorized by the council may apply to the Supreme Court for an order that authorizes a person named in the order

(a) to enter into the premises or land of the person named in the order at any reasonable time and conduct an inspection, examination or analysis,

(b) to require the production of any record, property, assets or things and to inspect, examine or analyze them, and on giving a receipt, to seize and remove any record, property, assets or things inspected, examined or analyzed under paragraph (a) or (b) for further inspection, examination or analysis.

Detention of things seized

57 (1) For the purposes of subsection (2), the person who makes a seizure under section 56 must report the seizure as soon as practicable to a judge of the Supreme Court, who must be the judge who issued the order under which the seizure is made unless this is not practicable.

(2) On receiving a report under subsection (1), the judge must

(a) order the thing that was seized returned to its owner or other person entitled to it unless satisfied that an order under paragraph (b) should be made, or

(b) order the thing detained if satisfied that the detention is required for the purposes of this Act.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the real purpose and the procedure adopted by the College in investigating the complaint of a relatively minor significance or de minimus nature as a basis for fitness to practice medicine was overzealous prosecution amount to malice and clearly contrary to public interest and failed to serve and protect the public and was not engaged in superintend the practice of the profession or government of the membership but furtherance of a conspiracy to injure the member of the College where there was no intention on the part of the College to discipline or to treat his rights to a living with the fairness required by law and was act in an egregious breach of Duties and objects of the college:

3 (1) It is the duty of the college at all times (a) to serve and protect the public, and . . (b) to exercise its powers and discharge its responsibilities under all enactments in the public interest. . . (2) The college has the following objects:

(a) to superintend the practice of the profession;

(b) to govern members according to this Act and the rules;

(c) to establish, monitor and enforce standards of education and qualifications for registration of members;

(d) to establish, monitor and enforce standards of practice to enhance the quality of practice and reduce incompetent, impaired or unethical practice amongst members;

(e) to establish and maintain a continuing competency program to promote high practice standards amongst members;

(f) to establish a patient relations program to seek to prevent professional misconduct of a sexual nature;

(g) to establish, monitor and enforce standards of professional ethics amongst members;

THAT CPSBC concedes that the overall conduct of the College viewed in its totality, undoubteldly offends the s. 2(e) of Bill of Rights and s. 7 Charter guaranteed principles of fundamental justice as outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Foundation of Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 4 (CanLII), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 257, at para. 8:

[8] Jurisprudence on s. 7 has established that a "principle of fundamental justice" must fulfill three criteria: R. v. Malmo-Levine, 2003 SCC 74 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, 2003 SCC 74, at para. 113. First, it must be a legal principle. This serves two purposes. First, it "provides meaningful content for the s. 7 guarantee"; second, it avoids the "adjudication of policy matters": Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, 1985 CanLII 81 (S.C.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 503. Second, there must be sufficient consensus that the alleged principle is "vital or fundamental to our societal notion of justice": Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 75 (S.C.C.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p. 590. The principles of fundamental justice are the shared assumptions upon which our system of justice is grounded. They find their meaning in the cases and traditions that have long detailed the basic norms for how the state deals with its citizens. Society views them as essential to the administration of justice. Third, the alleged principle must be capable of being identified with precision and applied to situations in a manner that yields predictable results. Examples of principles of fundamental justice that meet all three requirements include the need for a guilty mind and for reasonably clear laws.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the procedure adopted by the College was in breach of its constituting staute, Rules enacted pursuant to the Act and the Charter given that the seizure of the records amounted to "compulsorily required testimony" that violated s. 7 of Charter in a manner prohibited in R. v. S.(R.J.), 1995 CanLII 121 (S.C.C.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 589. 1995 CanLII 121 (S.C.C.) by Iacobucci J., at para. 27 . And in the result the College acted unconstitutionally with malice through a reckless admission of the conscripted evidence illegally and conspiratorially obtained by the College that was blatantly unconstitutional such that the derivative evidence relied upon could not have been obtained without the assistance of Dr. Verma, or the significance of which could not have been appreciated, but for the testimony of Dr. Verma as a witness which ought to have been excluded under s. 7 in the interests of trial fairness. Such evidence, created by the accused member and being self-incriminatory but volunteered or coerced, is manifestly illegally self-incriminatory because the evidence could not otherwise have become part of the College's case but for the help of the accused. To this extent, the accused as witness must be protected against assisting the prosecution in creating a case to meet for the prosecution, especially in the absence of legal counsel and without a reminder to the effect that the witness is not under any obligation to testify. (R. v. S.(R.J.), 1995)

THAT CPSBC concedes that it wilfully acted in exces of jurisdiction in proceedings wiht the inquiry into a complaint that is not traditionally a matter that College investigates, and also that the Parliament or the Legislation of British Columbia could not have intended to entrust the College with the prosecution of the offence of fraudulent MSP billing by physicians while circumventing the procedural protection of the criminal prosecution for fraud available to a Canadian under s. 380 of the Criminal Code. In order to determine whether College acted within its jurisdiction to undertake that inquiry, the constitutionality of the conferring provision must have been assessed as mandated in Gwala v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 9349 (F.C.A.), [1999] 3 F.C. 404 (F.C.A.) failure to do which renders the disposition a nullity.

THAT CPSBC concedes that without making the complaint known to the accused physician the collection of medical charts amounts to an impermissible examination for discovery and invasion of privacy which is actionable as strict liability tort without showing damages, as provided in s. of Privacy Act R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 373 because the College investigators do not fall in the exception of “public officer engaged in an investigation in the course of his or her duty under a law in force in British Columbia” as provided in s. 2(2)(ii) of Privacy Act and given the law that such discoveries and disclosures constitute serious encroachments on the privacy rights of a professional, as can be clearly inferred from the judgment of McIntyre J., who has outlined the pertinent law this way in Kunz v. Kunz Estate, (18 Oct 2004) SKQB 410 (CanLII) (2004), 253 Sask. R. 307 CFN: QB04397; FLD 335;A. D. 2002 J.C.R.; QBG No. 149 posted at http://canlii.org/sk/cas/skqb/2004/2004skqb410.html

[9] In Sterling v. Sullivan, 2003 SKQB 359 (CanLII), 2003 SKQB 359; 2003 SKQB 359 (CanLII), (2003), 231 D.L.R. (4th) 344; (2003), 236 Sask. R. 148 (Q.B.), the court reviewed the law in this area.

[19] In my opinion, the two main reasons for the implied undertaking rule are: (1) to preserve the privacy of the deponent, and (2) to encourage the deponent to be open and frank in answering the questions. Within both there is something of a desire to avoid needless self-incrimination. In Lac Minerals Ltd. v. New Cinch Uranium Ltd. et al., supra, Craig J. at p. 748 of his decision, in discussing the object of the implied undertaking rule adopted these comments of Lord Denning M.R. in Riddick v. Thames Board Mills Ltd., [1977] Q.B. 881 at 896: “Compulsion [to disclose] is an invasion of a private right to keep one’s documents to oneself. The public interest in privacy and confidence demands that this compulsion should not be pressed further than the course of justice requires.”

[14] In L. H. v. Caughell, [1996] O.J. No. 3331 (QL) (Ont. Gen. Div.), the plaintiff had commenced an action against the defendant doctor for assault and battery and negligence. The plaintiff had also filed a complaint with the College of Physicians and Surgeons arising out of the same events. The issue was whether any questions and answers from an examination for discovery of the doctor in the civil proceedings could be provided to the College and potentially used to impeach the doctor upon cross-examination in the disciplinary proceedings. The court found that an examination for discovery involved a serious encroachment on the privacy and confidentiality of a litigant, which encroachment should not be greater than was strictly required for the purpose of seeing that justice was done in the proceedings in which the discovery takes place. The court found that if the plaintiff was relieved of her implied undertaking the doctor would be stripped of the protection to which he would normally be entitled in a process that may affect his entitlement to practice his profession.

THAT CPSBC concedes that College is liable for tort for violation of Dr. Verma's right to privacy as protected by the Privacy Act that provides Privacy Act R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 373 that defnies a strict liability tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another while the conduct was un-consented and not authorized or required by or under a law in force in British Columbia, by a court or by any process of a court., as well as the s. 7 Charter based protection guarnateed to Dr. Verma as outline in Vickery v. Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), [1991] S.C.R. 671, a case considering the accessibility of exhibits in a criminal law context, canvassed by Cory J. discussed the privacy issue as follows at page 687:… the right to privacy inheres in the basic dignity of the individual. This right is of intrinsic importance to the fulfillment of each person, both individually and as a member of society. Without privacy, it is difficult for an individual to possess and retain a sense of self-worth to maintain an independence of spirit and thought. And the law outlined by Dickson J. (as he then was,) in Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (S.C.C.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; (1984), 55 A.R. 291; 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641; who pointed out, it is this standard that must be satisfied before the state can interfere with an individual's right to be left alone. It is an important and meaningful threshold. It requires an objective assessment and can be satisfied only where it is supported by credible evidence. There never was cogent evidence to support the search that the College embroiled into.

THAT CPSBC concedes that College is liable for tort for violation of Dr. Verma's right to privacy as protected by the Privacy Act. And the s. 8 Charter based protection guarnateed to Dr. Verma as outline in Hunter v. Southam Inc., 1984 CanLII 33 (S.C.C.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the existence of such a right. Dickson J. (as he then was) held that the purpose of the right against unreasonable search or seizure contained in s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was the protection of the privacy of the individual. In effect, s. 8 is the constitutional embodiment of the “right to be let alone by other people”. The intrusive conduct of the College is contrary to the views of Stewart J. in Katz v. United States 389 U. S. 347 (1967), at p. 351 that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures "protects people, not places", and quoted with approval the definition given by Stewart J. in that case to the right to privacy (at p. 350) as the "the right to be let alone by other people". There being no lawful basis with the College to place Dr.Verma under an ongoing chart surveillance without any complaint having been lodged against him of which a proper notice required by the Rules was given to Dr. Verma before engaging in that intrusion. By failing to take the necessary constitutional steps the College did interfered with the reasonable expectations of privacy of Dr. Verma contrary to s. 8 relates to given that the interference was manifestly malicious and unreasonable: R. v. Edwards, 1996 CanLII 255 (S.C.C.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 33. the purpose of s. 8 of the Charter is to "protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy" (Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) per Dickson C.J., at p. 160) becuase s. 8 clearly encompasses a "right to be left alone" by government unless and until the state develops a reasonable basis for interference held by Lamer J. in Reference Re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), such that By entering the clinic without prior written authorization of Dr. Verma, the initial entry by the investigators trespassed upon Dr. Verma's right to privacy guaranteed under s. 8 of the Charter, and the evidence thus adduced could not be admitted in a prosecution against him for being “fruits of crime”.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the facade of invesigation was adopted by the ulterior motive of defamation of Dr. Verma and preventing him from earning a living as a physician and not to monitor his actions as a health care provider and to accomplish that the College reckelessly and maliciously proceeded in a manner that constituted harassment, recklessness, negligence, breach of fiduciary-like duty, a breach of privacy, trespass and nuisance, as outlined in by Seaton J., in Davis v. McArthur (1969), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 250, 72 W.W.R. 69 (B.C.S.C.), Dyne Holdings Ltd. v. Royal Insurance Company of Canada, 1996 CanLII 3672 (PE S.C.A.D.), Petrov v. B.C. Ferry Corp., 2003 BCSC 270 (CanLII) (2003), 12 B.C.L.R. (4th) 380; Richardson v. Davis Wire Industries Ltd., (21 Apr 1997) CanLII 4221 Vanc. Reg. (BCSC), (1997), 28 C.C.E.L. (2d) 101; (1997), 33 B.C.L.R. (3d) 224 CFN- C946330, Getejanc v. Brentwood College Ass'n, (6 June 2001) BCSC 822 and St. Pierre v. Pacific Newspaper Group Inc. and Skulsky, (10 Feb 2006) Vanc Reg. BCSC 241 (CanLII) CFN- SO50765 per Rice J. at http://canlii.org/bc/cas/bcsc/2006/2006bcsc241.html

THAT CPSBC concedes that in perpetrating its abuse of opressive supervisor powers through reguarly surveying the patients files of Dr. Verma, the College was engaged in the unconstitutional conduct of an “unfocussed fact gathering exercise” or engaged in mischief to “investigate the possibility” without a “factual foundation for the allegation” in the procedure as admonished by British Columbia Court of Appeal decisions of Kuntz v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia 1996 CanLII 1843 (BC C.A.), (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 219 and Hammami v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia 1996 CanLII 1845 (BC C.A.), (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 267 and cited by Ritter J.A., in IMS Health Canada, Limited v. Information and Privacy Commissioner, (7 Oct 2005) ABCA 325 (CanLII) CFN- 0403-0075-AC at http://canlii.org/ab/cas/abca/2005/2005abca325.html at para 43.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College prosecutor breached his duty of fairness through failing to advise the panel and the Court of the breach of the rule requiring an “enhanced probability standard of evidence” and the malice and loss of jurisdiction engaged in through ralying on evidence that was at best ambiguous if not supporting the defence substancially more credibily than the case of the prsoecution which was based on fraud and criminality. Further the prosecution of the compalint before the panel was clearly malicious where an innoncent explanation offered by Dr. Verma corrobated by the written voluntary statement and an affidavit of the complainant had clearly raised sufficient doubt as to the likelihood of a finding of guilt. Proceeding with the prosecution with that poor a quality of evidence that was at best ambiguous while failing to consider the requirement of enhanced balance of probabilties clearly amounted to a malicious and opressive prosecution and the success of prosecution in these circumstances is irrelevant given that it could not have been obtained without the panel acting with bias.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the council acted negligently that caused it to lose jurisdiction by failing to advcise itself of the correct standard of proof in light of the question before it by disregarding the legal priniple to that effect enunicated by Spencer J., in Hanson v. British Columbia (Disciplinary Hearing Subcommittee of the College of Teachers)  (16 Apr 1991) BCSC ,Vanc. Reg., No.A901100  has noted at para 4: It is always helpful if the disciplinary tribunal states what standard it applies so that it can be readily seen if its decision is reviewed, but in my opinion it is not fatal to the decision if the standard is not articulated, provided that it appears clearly from the decision that the correct standard was applied in fact. It is very unclear from the reasons that a very low standard of proof was applied given that questionable and discreditable prosecution evidence was preferred over the cogent and irrefuted defence evidece.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College prosecutor breached his duty of fairness owed by him to Dr. Verma by failing to review the prosecution evidence before proceeding with the proseution which is to be reviewed at criminal standard of cogency given the grevious consequences on the accused professional as outlined by Malone J. A., in Sheriff v. Canada (Attorney General), (18 Apr 2006) FCA 139 (CanLII) CFN- A-114-05 at http://canlii.org/ca/cas/fca/2006/2006fca139.html at paras 32 by noting that “The requirement for increased disclosure is justified by the significant consequences for the professional person's career and status in the community. Some Courts have noted that a finding of professional misconduct may be more serious than a criminal conviction (see Howe v. Institute of Chartered Accountants 1994 CanLII 3360 (ON C.A.), (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 483 (C.A.) per Laskin J.A. in dissent at pages 495-496; Emerson v. Law Society of Upper Canada (1983), 44 O.R. (2d) 729, at page 744).

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College prosecutor breached his duty of fairness owed by him to Dr. Verma by failing to advise the Courts to review the prosecution evidence at the “enhanced degree of persuasion or enhanced standards of proof” as outlined by Berger J. A., in dissenting reasons in P. L. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of the Province of Alberta, 1999 ABCA 126 (CanLII) (1999), 173 D.L.R. (4th) 395; [1999] 10 W.W.R. 510; (1999), 69 Alta. L.R. (3d) 363 has outlined this principle at paras 88-98 as follows:

[69] Of course, a flexible civil standard of proof applicable to professional disciplinary cases, as leading commentators have made clear, is not to be confused with the adoption of a discrete third standard of proof in English law:

". . . A claim for rectification must, it has been said, be established by 'strong, irrefragable evidence' [Shelburne Countess Dowager v. Earl of Inchiquin (1784) 1 Bro. C.C. 338 at 341], and the Law Reform Committee, whilst conceding that the meaning, like the pronunciation of this expression is not beyond argument, considered it to be clear that a mere balance of probability is not enough. A high standard has been called for in cases of alleged professional misconduct as the Judicial Committee could not envisage professional men condemning each other on a mere balance of probabilities. [Bhandari v. Advocates Committee [1956] 3 All E.R. 742.] ... Observations of this sort will no doubt continue to be cited by the courts, but they do not support the importation of a third standard." [Emphasis added]

[71] . . . The flexibility of the civil standard of proof suffices to ensure that the court will require the high degree of probability, which is appropriate to what is at stake. "... the nature and gravity of an issue necessarily determines the manner of attaining reasonable satisfaction of the truth of the issue" . .

[84] The judgment of Haddad J.A. in Ringrose (No. 3), supra, clearly confirms that the "cogency of the evidence" required to satisfy the standard of proof may vary. This proposition is consistent with Dalton Cartage, supra, where Laskin C.J.C. seemed to be saying that a greater weight of evidence is necessary to establish serious civil allegations. What is unclear is whether the "preponderance of probability" standard referred to by Haddad J.A. is a mere preponderance, as arguably used in Dalton Cartage, supra, or an enhanced preponderance as perhaps allowed by Oakes, Bater and Khawaja, supra. Whether the phrase "preponderance of probabilities" is receptive to an enhanced standard of proof in the right cases is a question that is frequently answered differently by Canadian courts. Consider, for example, the different phrases used to describe the standard of proof in just some of these Canadian disciplinary cases:

In Bahinipaty v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan (1986) 50 Sask. R. 15 at 23, 25 (App. Trib.), using the "balance of probabilities standard", the Court stated that the College had to prove guilt by a "fair and reasonable preponderance of credible testimony", and required the facts to be "inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that the acts and language complained of were in fact committed and employed by the appellant."

In Coates v. Registrar Motor Vehicle Dealers (1988) 52 D.L.R. (4th) 272 at 282 the Court (Ont. H.C.J.) said that "Nothing short of clear and convincing proof based upon cogent evidence will justify an administrative tribunal in revoking a licence to practice medicine or to gain a livelihood in business."

Coutts v. Popplewell (14 February 1994) Vancouver No. C92348 (B.C.S.C.), applied the balance of probabilities standard, and citing Dalton Cartage and Bater "scrutinized the evidence in this case with great care."

Denys v. College of Nurses of Ontario (11 April 1983) O.J. No. 1046 (Ont. H.C.J.) adopted the statement that "in those cases involving criminal or quasi-criminal conduct, the trier of fact must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the gravity of the allegations, with 'special scrutiny' and be satisfied only with a clear preponderance of proof."

G. H. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (1995) 8 B.C.L.R. (3d) 392 (S.C.) required a "preponderance of cogent evidence to support the charges."

In Re Camgoz (1989) 74 Sask. R. 73 at 74 (C.A.) the Court did not reverse an appeal tribunal that communicated the standard of proof as requiring a medical board: 1. to establish the allegations by a "fair and reasonable preponderance of credible testimony"; 2. to "act on a balance of probabilities"; and 3. to apply "the highest possible standard applicable in a civil case."

[85] Despite the uncertainty in the case law, one series of decisions suggests that an enhanced standard of proof should apply to civil cases involving morally blameworthy conduct. In Alberta, for example, a memorandum of judgment delivered orally from the bench by Major J.A. (as he then was) in Law Society of Alberta v. Estrin (1992) 4 Alta. L.R. (3d) 373 (C.A.) states at pp. 373-374:

"The evidence required by the Law Society to reach a conclusion of deceit is short of that in a criminal proceedings but must meet a higher standard than the balance of probabilities." [Emphasis added][86] Lieberman J.A. in Nand v. Edmonton Public School District No. 7 (1994) 23 Alta. L.R. (3d) 63 at 66, 67 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1995] S.C.C.A. No. 8 (QL), also suggested that the civil standard was capable of being enhanced in appropriate cases. After reviewing Dalton Cartage, Bater and Oakes and acknowledging the ongoing debate about the prudence of requiring greater degrees of probability within the civil standard, Lieberman J.A. said (at. pp. 68-70):

[88] The law is perhaps clearer in British Columbia, where an enhanced standard of proof seems to have been accepted. In College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia v. J.C., supra, Locke J.A. said (at p. 268-269):

"In the instant case, the trial judge [Taylor J.] said at pp. 1581 and 1582:

In the present case the disciplinary committee considered the required standard at the outset of its report. It says:

The onus of proving the facts against [the doctor] rests with the College. To discharge that burden a high standard of proof is called for going beyond the balance of probabilities and based on clear and convincing evidence . The case for the College must be proven by a fair and reasonable preponderance of credible evidence.'

This is essentially the view adopted by McLachlin J. (as she then was) in the decision of this court in Jory v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of B.C., B.C.S.C., Vancouver No. A850601, 13th December 1985 (not yet reported).

While the cases provide no clear rule, the most helpful term used in various judicial pronouncements on this subject seems to me to be the word >convincing'. To be >convinced' means more than merely to be persuaded. I think the test to be applied in the present case is whether, on the evidence before it, the committee could properly have been convinced that the patient had told the truth in making her accusations of sexual misconduct against the doctor

I am content to adopt that extract from the trial judge as setting out the law, and am satisfied that the committee properly directed themselves in this regard." [Emphasis added]

[89] In Jory, supra, McLachlin, J. said this about the standard of proof and evidentiary standard:

"The standard of proof required in cases such as this is high. It is not the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But it is something more than a bare balance of probabilities . The authorities establish that the case against a professional person in a disciplinary hearing must be proved by a fair and reasonable preponderance of credible evidence. . . The evidence must be sufficiently cogent to make it safe to uphold the findings with all the consequences for the professional person's career and status in the community ..." [Emphasis added]

[90] Thackray J. followed the reasoning of Taylor J. in another British Columbia case -- McKee v. College of Psychologists of British Columbia (1 November 1991) Vancouver No. A900383 (B.C.S.C.), aff'd without addressing the standard of proof issue (1994) 95 B.C.L.R. (2d) 62 (C.A.). Thackray J. Said:

"Taylor J. in J.C. v. College , supra, said that the courts have not been prepared to define the degree to which the proof must go beyond a mere balance of probabilities. This is understandably so in that the degree will vary according to the gravity of the consequences. I am of the opinion that when a persons'' professional integrity is at stake the standard should come perilously close to the criminal standard. That is, beyond a reasonable doubt. It certainly must attain the status wherein it would be appropriate to use the adjectives "strong", "clear", "cogent", and "convincing". [Emphasis added]

[91] I suggest that use of the latter adjectives reflects an acknowledgement of an enhanced degree of persuasion within the civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities.

[92] The British Columbia Court of Appeal continues to apply enhanced standards of proof to disciplinary cases involving morally blameworthy conduct. Hammami v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of British Columbia 1996 CanLII 1845 (BC C.A.), (1996) 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 267 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 282 (QL), Hollinrake J.A.'s judgment (Cumming J.A. concurring, Southin J.A. concurring in the result, and Lambert J.A. dissenting with Rowles J.A. concurring) reads (at p. 303):

“I should add here that I agree with the statement of Donald J. (then) when he said, in the case of Dr. Hammami: . the College holds the professional life of a doctor, in its hands; accordingly, it carries the onus of a high degree of fairness in conducting competency proceedings....

The concern of the courts in these cases is seen in the words of Taylor J. in C. (J.) v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (British Columbia), (1988), 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 383 (S.C.), at pp. 398-99, that a degree of proof is required beyond the usual onus in civil cases, of balance of probabilities:

The requirement for more compelling proof in cases such as this has typically been expressed by the use of adjectives such as "strong", "clear", "cogent" and "convincing" used in relation to the evidence necessary to achieve the required "degree" or "standard" of proof.” [Emphasis added]

[93] G.W. Bell also suggests that it is proper to elevate the standard of proof in professional disciplinary cases involving morally blameworthy conduct. Bell's article "The Standard of Proof in Professional Disciplinary Matters" (1995) 53 The Advocate 255 explains (at pp. 256-257):

"In disciplinary matters before a domestic tribunal the civil standard of proof is prima facie the appropriate standard in the absence of any express statutory provision: R v. Hampshire County Council, ex parte Ellerton, [1985] 1 All ER 599, at 602 (C.A.).

The Court of Appeal in that case also addressed the issue of applying a flexible standard of proof to disciplinary matters:...

I submit that a proper interpretation of these two cases [Hanson, supra and Jory, supra] shows that the British Columbia courts were only acknowledging that the civil standard of proof is flexible. In the Jory case the appellant was charged with setting up a scheme to secure patients in order to increase his revenue under the guise of conducting a study of eye pathology among native children and was convicted of "infamous conduct", suspended for one year and fined. In Hanson, a teacher was charged for having touched a female student "deliberately, improperly and for his own gratification" and was found guilty of professional misconduct. In both cases, the allegations were serious, involving an element of deceit or moral turpitude. The possible penalties faced by the professionals were quite serious. The courts in those cases were correct in holding that a mere balance of probabilities was insufficient to establish the facts. However, they did not recognize a special standard of proof for professional disciplinary matters and ought not be interpreted as departing from the authorities cited above (which, except for Bhandari, were not referred to in the judgments) with respect to the flexibility of the civil standard.

It would be wrong to approach the allegations in a professional disciplinary matter as if a single degree of probability were required for all without regard to the exact nature of the allegations. Not all charges of professional misconduct involve deceit or moral turpitude. Disciplinary charges can also relate to matters that do not qualify as "professional misconduct", with its implication of a severe penalty upon conviction. Matters such as professional incompetence, non-compliance with regulations and "conduct unbecoming" may also form the subject of disciplinary hearings. They also imply a lesser penalty. Applying the rule of flexibility in the civil standard of proof, it is possible that, depending on the facts alleged, a case may be established on a mere balance of probabilities, or on a degree of certainty lower than that required to establish an allegation involving deceit or moral turpitude, as long as it is "commensurate with the occasion". [Italics in original Emphasis added]

[94] All of the foregoing leads one to question whether in professional disciplinary cases the "flexible" civil standard is modified only by the evidentiary weighing process, or whether the standard is actually heightened by degrees of probability. If the first interpretation is correct, all that is required is that the trier be persuaded that it is more probable than not that the alleged misconduct occurred. Under this first interpretation, any consideration of the seriousness of the allegation would be restricted to the weighing process and would not affect, or enhance, the standard of proof itself.

[95] If the second interpretation is correct, the trier of fact must be persuaded -- to a greater degree than a mere preponderance of probability -- that the alleged misconduct occurred. In other words, the second interpretation allows for the standard to vary depending on the seriousness of the allegation. And where a higher standard is used, the fact finder must be persuaded of the truth of the allegation to a greater degree.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College prosecutor breached his duty of fairness by failing to adv ise the court of the need to observer an aspect of proportionality which has been considered on occasion by the American courts: a comparison with punishments imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction: see Solem v. Helm (1983), 463 U.S. 277 at p. 291

THAT CPSBC concedes that by persuading that Meredit J., not review the decision of the panel on merits but undertake a judicial review it perpetrated fraud on the court where the court paid no regard to the legal principoles stated by Bauman J., that clarify the nature of the supervisory function granted by the statute as follows in M.(M.) v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, (4 Nov 2002) BCSC1535 No. L010430 at http://canlii.ca/bc/cas/bcsc/2002/2002bcsc1535.html as follows at paras 25-27:

IV. THE SCOPE OF THE APPEAL

[25] Section 71(1) of the Medical Practitioners Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.285, provides the appellant with the right of appeal to this court from a decision of the council of the College.

[26] By s. 71(3), an appeal from a decision of council must be considered to include an appeal from the findings and report of the Inquiry Committee.

[27] Section 73 of the Act is the critical provision on the scope of the appeal:

Appeal to be heard on merits

73 The appeal under section 71 must be determined by the court on the merits, despite any lack of form, but the court may give directions for a proper hearing and adjudication.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it breached its duty of fairness that offends the law held by Williams J., in Hammami v. The College of Physicians And Surgeons of B.C., 1997 CanLII 651 (BC S.C.) [1997] 9 W.W.R. 301; (1997), 47 Admin. L.R. (2d) 30; (27 June 1997), 36 B.C.L.R. (3d) 17 has confirmed that s. s.62-64 (now s. 71) of Medical Practitioners Act R.S.B.C. 1979, c.254 (now R.S.B.C. 1996, c.285) mandating that appeal under section 62 shall be heard and determined by the court on the merits. Meredith J., however was persuaded by the College to proceed as a judicial review.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it breached its duty of fairness before Low J., by failing to advise that the application of Dr. Verma ought to have been allowed given that the Concil had erred in failing to conform ot the law stated by Shabbits J. in Brock-Berry v. Registered Nurses' Assn. of British Columbia, (17 February 1994) Vancouver Registry BCSC A930658, affirmed (31 August, 1995) Vancouver Registry  BCCA CA018500. And given that the one year had already elapsed the comments of Low J., to the effect that Dr. Verma can apply for resinstatement, the matter before the court in reality was refusal by the council to re-instate Dr. Verma and the decision of the College was unlawful and breached duty of fairness which applied as per the conclusions of Ruttan J. in Bakht v. Council of College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia et al. (1980) 20 BCLR 43, (appeal dismissed August 18, 1981). holding that while the Council of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia did not sit as a judicial or quasi-judicial body when dealing with applications for registration it was still "subject to a duty of fairness". Breach of this duty is contrary to ss. 2(d), and 7 of Charter given the serious impact of that decision on liberty and dignity interests of Dr. Verma. the distinction Mussani v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (2003), 226 D.L.R.(4th) 511 being that the right of the state to impose restrictions is opressive, extreme, unreasonable and not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice given the flargrant breach of duty of fairness at every single step. Damages must be awarded to Dr. Verma in light of the clearly aceepted distinction between "right to work as a purely economic issue" and "the right to pursue a livelihood or profession as a matter concerning one’s dignity and sense of self-worth" as conceded by Lamer, J. (as he then was) in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, 1990 CanLII 105 (S.C.C.), [1990] 4 W.W.R. 481 as expanded by Wittmann J. A. has noted in Hunt v. Smolis-Hunt, ( 14 Sep 2001) ABCA 229 No. 9803-0329-AC, 9803-0285-AC

[21] Given the importance of work, it is equally important to allow individuals the freedom to pursue work which provides not only a livelihood but also a sense of identity, self-worth and emotional well-being, subject to the right of the state to impose, in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, legitimate and reasonable restrictions on the activities of individuals: Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 171 (B.C.C.A.). Similarly, Kerans, J.A. for this Court stated in Black v. Law Society of Alberta (1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 527 at 543, "The pursuit of a livelihood through a trade or calling has been, in Canada, accepted as an appropriate and vital human ambition, available to those of either sex who want or need to pursue it . . ."

[also see : R. v. Jones, 1986 CanLII 32 (S.C.C.), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 per Wilson, J. at 318, R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 CanLII 90 (S.C.C.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, Wilson v. Medical Services Commission (1988), 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1, all cited by Wittmann J.A., ( Picard J.A. concurring) at para 148-152 in United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (City of), 2002 ABCA 131 (CanLII) [2002] 8 W.W.R. 51; (2002), 94 C.R.R. (2d) 290; (2002), 3 Alta. L.R. (4th) 211]

In Slattery v. Canada (Human Rights Comm.) (No. 1) (1994, 22 C.H.R.R. D/205 (F.C.T.C.), the court noted at para. 48 that the two preconditions which must exist for the fairness of an investigation are neutrality and thoroughness. (Goodfellow J., in Dr. Daniel Okoro v. Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, (28 Jul 2006) NSSC 236 (CanLII) S.H. No. 264678 at http://canlii.ca/ns/cas/nssc/2006/2006nssc236.html)

THAT CPSBC concedes that the proceedings against Dr. Verma were in breach of his s. 7 Charter protected rights and the manner of application of the Medical Practitioners Act offended and perpetuated the s. 7 Charter tort such that the damages equivalent the life-time earnings of Dr. Verma in accorance with the doctrine of nemo dat are payable given the legal principle that "If liberty or security of the person under section 7 of the Charter were defined in terms of attributes such as dignity, self-worth and emotional well-being, it seems that liberty under s. 7 would be all-inclusive." enunicated in Chodos, Re, (21 Mar 1996) CanLII 792 (ONLSDC) at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onlsdc/1996/1996onlsdc10004.html because right to be a member of the College of Physicians and the Canadian Medical Council is distinct from the right to earn a living in by means that carries no constitutional protection, especially when the removal for these memberships was done unlawfully, unconstitutionally and in fact conspiratorialy.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it offended the law stated by Dickson, C.J., in Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.) (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 199 (S.C.C.), who found professional association membership elements of self-worth and emotional well-being as Charter protected. and Cory, J. in United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., 1999 CanLII 650 (S.C.C.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 at para. 25. at pp 198-9, "If by this it is meant that something as fundamental as a person’s livelihood or dignity in the workplace is beyond the scope of constitutional protection, I cannot agree." Lamer J. (as he then was) in Reference Re Criminal Code: Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man)., 1990 CanLII 105 (S.C.C.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at 1170 held that Charter is engaged when reputation in the community and self-esteem are involved.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it likely also offended s. 15 Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124 given that mental disability of Dr. Verma and the fitness to conduct the defence was in issue and there was no corroboration of the prosecution witness given that the testimony of Mr. Frazee could not be admitted for being tainted with criminality.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it breached its duty of fairness before Low J., by failing to advise that the application of Dr. Verma ought to have been allowed and stressing that the "court’s role is to ask whether the penalty is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances" (see: Smith v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, (13 Mar 2006) CanLII 7282 (ONSCDC) CFN- 29/04 per O’Driscoll J., at para 27 http://canlii.org/on/cas/onscdc/2006/2006onscdc10040.html) And that there was a clear application of the principle that penalty could be disturbed if there is an error in principle, and where “the punishment clearly does not fit the crime” See: Re Takahashi and College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 363, 364 (Div. Ct.) per Robins J. in O’Driscoll J. in Smith v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, (13 Mar 2006) CanLII 7282 (ONSCDC) CFN- 29/04 at para 27, and in MacDiarmid v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, (22 Jan 2003) CanLII 26351 (ONSCDC) CFN- 271-01 at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onscdc/2003/2003onscdc10075.html per Lane J., at para 3. (three years suspension where the doctor defrauded the public), Brock-Berry v. Registered Nurses' Assn. of British Columbia, (17 February 1994) Vancouver Registry BCSC A930658 per Shabbits J., affirmed (31 August, 1995) Vancouver Registry BCCA CA018500.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it breached its duty strictly comply with the statute but took plenty of liberties with non-compliance with the provisions of the Medical Practitioners Act that the jurisdiction was lost given that it is established law that jurisdiction of an administrative official (e.g. an immigration officer) will not be presumed. Where jurisdictions are conditioned upon the existence of certain things, their existence must be clearly established before jurisdiction can be exercised, (see: Samejima v. Canada [1932] S.C.R. 640, where Lamont J., speaking for the majority such that in order to have quashed the decision of the discipline committee "judicial intervention is clearly warranted" as per the the law stated in Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society, Judicial Committee 1991 CanLII 26 (S.C.C.), (1991), 84 D.L.R. (4th) 105 p. 119 (S.C.C.). on grounds of “manifest errors” (see: College of Nurses v. Quiogue, (1993) 13 O.R. (3d) 325 (Div. Ct.))

THAT CPSBC concedes that it breached its duty by failing to advise Meredith J., that no deference was necessary given that billing fraud is not an area where the Court needs to show deference to the college given that the panel of physicians possessed no special expertise that the court does, as outlined in Hammami v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia 1997 CanLII 651 (BC S.C.), (1998), 36 B.C.L.R. (3d) 17, the Court, in reviewing a decision on whether a physician was competent to practice medicine, made it clear that the Council, which is composed of physicians, should be entitled to some deference because it has significant expertise not found in a judge hearing an appeal. In fact that understanding of criminal acts is superior with the court than administrative panels. Because, deference will be called for only where the decision-making body is, in some way, more expert than the courts and the question under consideration is one that falls within the scope of this greater expertise: see Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, 2002 SCC 11, at para. 50. It is not tenable that the College has better expertise in criminal prosecutions than the courts.

THAT CPSBC concedes that it breached its duty of fairness and protection of reputation of Dr. Verma by overzealous and in fact malicious prosecution by proceeding capriciously and decietfully and not balancing the rights of the public protection and of the professional that offends the rule that the “decision of Council to uphold the termination of an investigation is a discretionary one. In deciding whether or not to proceed with a disciplinary hearing, Council must consider not only the interests of the complainant but also the rights of the investigated person and its responsibility as the governing body of a self-governing profession.” stated in Friends of the Old Man River Society v. Assn. of Professional Engineers, Geologist and Geophysicists of Alberta, [2001] A.J. No. 568 (C.A.) at para. 37. The fact that the misconduct could not in any way affect the interests of the complainant ought to have persuaded the College to dismiss the complaint entirely or at best issue a warning to the physician.

THAT CPSBC admits that it was in breach of duty of fairness as demanded by doctrine of legitimate expectations and consistency (McLachlin C.J. in Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650, 2004 SCC 48 (CanLII) (2004), 241 D.L.R. (4th) 83; (2004), 121 C.R.R. (2d) 261; (2004), 17 Admin. L.R. (4th) 165) by the College given that unlike other phsyicians he was not given any opporutnity to respond to the complaint filed aginst him but referred to the inqury committeey panel as the first step. The manner of prosecution of Dr. Verma which is better described as persecution was cleary discriminatory and likely racially motivated.

THAT CPSBC admits to have breached the duty of fairness which requires timely and adequate notice of the particular acts or conduct said to be disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional. A complaint must reasonably delineate the issues to that the party charged may know and can meet the case against him: de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 3rd ed. (1973), pp.178-80, whcih was breached by not giving sufficient notice such that many of the findings made by the panel were not in the notice at all.

THAT CPSBC admits to have breached the duty of fairness such that the ambiguity of the charge led the Inquiry Committee to focus on irrelevant matters with the result that the conviction is based not on the charge per se but on allegations of improper billing and medical examination. (Jory v. The College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia (13 December 1985), Vancouver A850601, per McLachlin J., (as she then was) at p.7).

THAT CPSBC admits to have imposed an extreme and malicious penalty which is at a serious variance with the penalty of a suspension of Dr. Dhaliwal’s certificate of registration for ten (10) months in Singh Dhaliwal v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, (6 Apr 2005) CanLII 12850 (ONSCDC) (2005), 197 O.A.C. 7 for borrowing several thousand dollars from his patients which is substantially larger sum and a lot more serious breach of trust than that found aginst Dr. Verma.

THAT CPSBC admits to have imposed an extreme and malicious penalty which is at a serious variance with the the position adopted upon pointing out the parallel in the manner of scrutiny by the reviewing court of the conduct and reasons of the tribunals and that of the review of the trial judge by the Court of Appeal was noted by stating “The principles as set out by the Court of Appeal in Waxman v. Waxman [2004] O.J. No. 1765, are, while referring to a decision of a trial judge, are in many ways applicable to decisions such as this by Discipline tribunals” noted by Meehan J., in College of Chiropractors of Ontario v. Kovacs, (26 Oct 2004) CanLII 34624 (ONSCDC) CFN- 662/03 at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onscdc/2004/2004onscdc10467.html at para 236.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the prosecution before the Inquiry Committee was malicious given that the evidence was insufficient to meet the very high onus onus on the moving party at the enhanced balance of probabilities standard of proof as outlined by Brenner CJSCBC in Blackwater v. Plint, (10 July 2001) Vancouver Registry BCSC 997 CFN- A960336/ A972666/ C975834 upon citing Lord Denning in Bater v. Bater, [1950] 2 All E.R. 458 (C.A.), at p.459, which stand for the rule that more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence must be (Board of Ophthalmic Dispensers v. Toth, [1990] O.J. No. 1802 cited by Meehan J., in College of Chiropractors of Ontario v. Kovacs, (26 Oct 2004) CanLII 34624 (ON SCDC) CFN- 662/03 at http://canlii.org/on/cas/onscdc/2004/2004onscdc10467.html at para 114.) and practice of fraud and conspiracy that were alleged.

THAT CPSBC concedes that its search and seizure was unlawful given the principle “that no court--and by extension, it is submitted, no other body--has jurisdiction to order disclosure of privileged information.” Geo. Cluthe Mfg. Co. v. ZTW Properties Inc. (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 370 and the prosecution relied upon unlawfully obtained privileged personal records without consent of the patients that containted their psychiatric records.

THAT CPSBC concedes that Mr. Martin would be liable in tort and for cost awards, given that he was clearly acting "outside the scope of his duty as a solicitor" (the actions of the solicitor were qua solicitor) and was in breach of his duty is to his client and to the court and through relying on fraud and fabrication of evidence relied on crimianal acts in his conspiracy of intentional interference with the Charter protected profesional memberships and ensuing economical rights.

THAT CPSBC concedes that Mr. Martin would be liable in tort and for cost awards, given that he was clearly engaged in an intentional tort and that it mattered not whether the actions of the solicitor were qua solicitor besides acting outside the scope of his duty as a solicitor as noted by Dilks J. in Bronfman v. Richler, (23 Jan 2003) CanLII 27097 (ONSC) CFN- 02-CV-225096CM1 at http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2003/2003onsc10059.html as follows at para 3:

[3] It is clear and well-settled law that a solicitor’s only duty is to his client and to the court. He owes no duty to an opposing party, and may not be sued in tort, or otherwise, by that party, unless he has injured that party while he was acting outside the scope of his duty as a solicitor. See: R. v. Tighe and Maher (1926), 26 S.R. (N.S.W.) 94 at 108-9, as cited in Re: Moage Limited Co. (In Liquidation) (1998), 153 A.L.R. 711 (Fed Ct.); Re: Lang, Michner et al. and Fabian et al. 1987 CanLII 172 (ON S.C.), (1987), 59 O.R. (2d) 353 (H.C.J.); Carnegie v. Rasmussen Starr Ruddy (1994), 19 O.R. (3d) 272 (Gen. Div.); Edwards v. Kitely, [1987] O. J. No. 1190; Gone Hollywood Video Ltd. v. Skrabic (1997), 50 Alta L.R. (3d) 146 (Q.B.); Jones v. Preece, [1998] E.W.J. No. 1822 (C.A.); German v. Major et al. (1985), 39 Alta L.R. (2d) 270 (C.A.); Brignolio v. Desmarais, Keenan, [1995] O. J. No. 3449 (Gen. Div.).

THAT CPSBC concedes that Mr. Martin was engaged in a conspiracy with the College in the conduct that was a malicious prosecution under the guise of disciplinary proceedings and the outcome of proceedings is irrelevant where the conviction is based upon tainted evidence, and there is overwhelming evidence of malice as can be reasonably inferred from the fact that “[m]alice may be inferred if police continued the prosecution either for an improper purpose or in reckless disregard of evidence which would have disclosed the unreliability of the information provided” as indicated by Campbell J., in Coulter v. Toronto Police Services Board, (12 Jul 2006) CanLII 23919 (ONSC) CFN-04-CV-270869 CM3 at para 29 . After citing Watters v. Pacific Delivery Service Ltd. (1964), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 661 (BCSC) and Oniel v. Toronto (Metropolitan) Police Force 2001 CanLII 24168 (ON C.A.), (2001), 195 D.L.R. (4th) 59 (Ont. C.A.) leave denied by S.C.C. The conduct of the College is actionable for being a wilful and intentional effort on the College's part to abuse or distort its proper role as outlined in Proulx v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 66 (CanLII), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9 at para 35 as the test for malicious prosecution.

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College is vicariously liable for breaches of fairness on the part of Mr. Martin as the prosecuting counsel for abuse of prosecutorial powers of the College by not acting fairly in the pre-hearing stage, the inquiry and the review by the Court by breaching the duty of candor that he was under legal obligation as the officer of the court, which has been expressed by LeBel J., in R. v. V.(J.), (1994), 91 C.C.C. (3d) 284 by noting that “Crown counsel, of course, while bound by strict duties so as to ensure the preservation of the integrity of the criminal justice system, however must operate in the context of an adversarial procedure. . . . the case retains its adversarial nature and Crown counsel, while an officer of the court, does not act as defence counsel” although the adversarial nature of the process in disciplinary matters is expected to be lot less hostile than criminal prosecution.

THAT CPSBC concedes that tort of malicious prosecution against the College ought to be send to trial given that under analogous circumstances Dunn J., tried a case of malicious prosecution despite a conviction, that has not yet been appealed, in King v. Ontario (Attorney General), (6 Feb 2006) CanLII 2893 (ONSC) CFN-01-BN-1316;02-BN-962 http://canlii.org/on/cas/onsc/2006/2006onsc10266.html

THAT CPSBC concedes that the College is vicariously liable for the intentional torts perpetrated by Mr. Martin, for which he could be found guilty of given the principle that solicitor immunity not to be abused to shelter parties from tort liabilities. And that in further defence of these matters Mr. Martin must not act for the College given the rule that Court should not be placed in the untenable position of having to assess the credibility of a witness who has already been acting as counsel at trial (Rothman v. Nesbitt Burns Inc., (2004) 5 C.P.C. (6th) 117 at para. 15 (Ont. S.C.J.)). That is in line with the Rule 4.02(2) of the LSUC Rules of Professional Conduct provides as follows:

4.02(2) Subject to any contrary provisions of the law or the discretion of the tribunal before which the lawyer is appearing, a lawyer who appears as advocate shall not testify before the tribunal unless permitted to do so by the rules of court or the rules of procedure of the tribunal, or unless the matter is purely formal or uncontroverted.

THAT CPSBC concedes that its misconduct of pervasively and maliciously prosecuting Dr. Verma without any attempt at his rehabiligation has produced irreversiable psychological or mental illness that was the result of the reckless disregard for his welfare and vindictiveness that was targetted at inflicint of mental suffering that violated his constitutional right that the College was under a duty to protect notwithstanding the need percieve by the College to engage in disciplianry steps that were taken therefore damages ought to be awarded for this permanent psychological injury that has been compounded through denail of treatment on the princioples outlined by Goudge J.A., in Wynberg v. Ontario, (7 Jul 2006) CanLII 22919 (ONCA) CFN-C43425 at http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/onca/2006/2006onca10502.html at para [214] Similarly, the right to security of the person extends to government conduct that places individuals at risk of serious mental suffering: R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 CanLII 90 (S.C.C.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at 56; Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35 (CanLII), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 at para. 116.

[247] In that regard, they argue this case is analogous to other decisions recognizing that a duty of care arises on the part of government actors in favour of users of government services. For example, see Just v. British Columbia, 1989 CanLII 16 (S.C.C.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228; K.L.B. v. British Columbia, 2003 SCC 51 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403; and Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen, 1984 CanLII 21 (S.C.C.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2.

Yours truly,

______________Carole Ann Brown.