RECIPIENT (S) :                      November 06, 2006 [Pgs = 3]

·        Mr. Edward A. Tanaka Barrister and Solicitor, Director, Legal Advice & Representation of Legal Services Society via fax: (604) 601-6195

·        Ms. Vikki Bell Q. C. (Registrar British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal ) via fax (604) 775-2020

·        Ms. Sarah Frost, via email safrost@justice.gc.ca and fax (604) 775-7557

·        Ms. Catharine Herb-Kelly via email cgherb-kelly@telus.net

·        Ms. Natalie Barnes solicitor for A.G. of B. C. via email Natalie.Barnes@gov.bc.ca

Re: Requiring AGC BCHRT and LSS to concede conspiracy to injure Dr. Verma

Attention: Mr. Tanaka, Ms Bell and Ms. Frost.

TAKE NOTICE that this communication aims to confirm that you do not intend to end your abusive, unconstitutional conduct or ongoing Charter torts nor concede that there is a duty of the Attorney General of Canada, (AGC) British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal (BCHRT) Legal Services Society (LSS) to take all necessary steps to protect the Charter rights of public in general and the vulnerable members of community in particular, that by declining to provide legal representation by a competent counsel you are in criminal breach of your constitutional duties owed to Dr. Verma through admitting the truth of the following twelve (12) facts within before 4:00 PM pursuant to abridged Rule 255:

1.     THAT while acknowledging receipt of only some of our telephone voicemail messages, faxes, and emails, which we have sent to the offices of AGC BCHRT and LSS, each one of you has been acting deceitfully by writing back nonsense that is completely unresponsive to the issues raised, is despicably fraudulent or deceitful and fails to meet the minimum acceptable levels of civility let alone the professionalism expected from members of a Bar in any country, although fairly consistent with the dismally absent ethics of the Canadian Bar.

2.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS, is acting in breach of duty of fairness and discriminating against Dr. Verma by offending doctrine of legitimate expectation and consistency in conduct of statutory actors as outlined by McLachlin C.J. the Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 650, 2004 SCC 48 (CanLII)(2004), 241 D.L.R. (4th) 83; (2004) where a positive obligation to preserve freedoms of claimants was recognized and LSS was and is bound to exercise the powers conferred upon it fairly, in good faith and with a view to the public interest and that this duty of procedural fairness to the claimants was heightened by the aggravated potential for abuse of discretionary statutory authority under the circumstances where the review procedure through access to courts has been unconstitutionally foreclosed by the misconduct and criminal acts of the respondents. In refusing to justify its decisions, each of the respondents has and is persisting in breaching their respective duties of procedural fairness, and have acted in a manner that is arbitrary and “straddled the boundary separating good from bad faith”. The mischief having been compounded through going to elaborate lengths in impeding any means of communication and resorting to uncivil or barbaric steps to avoid being held accountable for the unconstitutional, unlawful and criminal acts of the errant public servants who do not wish to serve the public, but are determined to further conspiracies to injure.

3.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to the informations that the claimants intend to bring before the court and would have been permitted but for the criminal acts of the respondents who are engaged in reckless breach of their duties through evasiveness, recklessness and other heinous acts.

4.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to the conspiracy of unlawfully and criminally denying the claimants a remedy that perpetuates the effects of the very discrimination which the Court is being asked to find violating the Charter when the obvious remedy - the advancement of legal expenses and a solicitor to assist the claimant - remains readily available and is the sole remedy which is contrary to the law laid down by McLachlin J., (now C J.) in Miron v. Trudel, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 693; (1995), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 1995 CanLII 97 (S.C.C.) (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 160; (1995), as follows at para 179:

[179] It is suggested that the Court could fashion a remedy for the appellants under s. 24(1) of the Charter, which provides that "[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms ... have been infringed or denied may apply to a court . . . to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances". In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 75 (S.C.C.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p. 577, this Court (per Lamer C.J., dissenting on other grounds) suggested that an order of suspension of invalidity might be coupled with individual relief in the form of a "constitutional exemption" to the applicant who has suffered the Charter violation and has initiated court proceedings to obtain Charter relief. . .

5.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to the most egregious and inhumane mischief of obstructing justice and perpetrating a Charter tort, by fraudulently persuading the Court to deny the remedy that is appropriate and just in the circumstances that the Court is without power to deny or dismiss the applications of the claimants given that there is a clear right of action, stated by Lord Esher M.R. in Attorney-General v. Lord Sudeley, [1896] 1 Q.B. 354 (C.A.) at p. 359, notwithstanding the fraudulent motion stating that there is no cause of action brought by AGC on behalf of a large list of criminals including the lawyers named above, to shelter them from penal sanctions.

6.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to the most egregious and inhumane mischief of obstructing justice in direct breach of their statutory mandate and their oath of officer of the court of assisting with access to justice, through defrauding the court into misapplication of law through not allowing the constitutional exception to the statutory provisions that the claimants hold are unconstitutional or are being applied in an unconstitutional manner in the circumstances such that the failure to grant the exception from compliance with the unconstitutional statutory provisions itself could be corruptly and unlawfully relied upon by the respondents to insulate the unconstitutional nature of the statutory provisions being abused by the defendants and the courts to injure the Charter and human rights of the claimants from being struck or being granted exemption from through reading down or reading in Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, 1991 CanLII 60 (S.C.C.) (1991), 82 D.L.R. (4th) 321; per Sopinka, Cory and McLachlin JJ. (now C. J.)

7.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to the most egregious and inhumane mischief of obstructing justice in direct breach of their statutory mandate and their oath of officer of the court of assisting with access to justice, through defrauding the court by concealing the fact and interfering with the proper discharging of Courts duty under Section 24(1) of the Charter, that “enables a Court to grant a constitutional exemption from legislation that is constitutional in its general application if in the circumstances of a particular case an unconstitutional result would otherwise occur”. (L'Heureux-Dubé J., for majority in R. v. Rose, (1998), 166 D.L.R. (4th) 385; (1998), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, 1998 CanLII 768 (S.C.C.) (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 576; at para 66) in order to knowingly produce illegal or unconstitutional outcome, by not permitting the Court to apply the law correctly by analogy to that applied in Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157, 1997 CanLII 295 (S.C.C.)) the manner where the Court granted NWT egg producers a constitutional exemption from the regulatory system [Canadian Egg Licensing Regulations, 1987]. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the respondents should have public interest standing and affirmed his decision except with regard to s. 15(1) of the Charter where Supreme Court allowed appeal. And further concealing the legal principle explained by McLachlin C.J., that courts may “uphold the law on the basis that it is constitutionally valid in the vast majority of its applications and stipulate that if and when unconstitutional applications arise, the [claimant] may seek a constitutional exemption” R. v. Sharpe, (2001), 194 D.L.R. (4th) 1; [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2 (CanLII) at para 113 which would be applicable to all of the Rules being relied upon to deny access to justice to the claimants herein.

8.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to being engaged in fraud on court among other offences by criminally concealing from the court the fundamental principle that “Rules should be used as tools to obtain remedies, not to foreclose them”: emphasized by Marceau J.,. at para 14 of his reasons in Trang v. Edmonton Remand Centre, (16 Oct 2001) ABQB884 No. 016033268-U1 posted at http://www.canlii.org/ab/cas/abqb/2001/2001abqb884.html upon quoting McDonald, J., in Reese v.Alberta (Minister of Forestry, Lands and Wildlife (1992), 87 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Alta.Q.B.) at 13 as authority for this basic principle of justice. And the rule that in proper court practice, a meritorious claim will be permitted to proceed, perhaps on terms, despite a breach of the rules. In the few cases where relief is denied, it is being denied by a court of competent jurisdiction to deal with s. 24(1) relief emphasized by Carthy J. A.,for the majority in Prete v. Ontario (A. G.), 1993 CanLII 3386 (ONCA)

9.     THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to further criminally of concealing the law that in M.(K.) v. M.(H.) 1992 CanLII 31 (S.C.C.), (1992), 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289 at pp. 301-2, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, 14 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.), La Forest J. has noted that the “purpose of the Charter, in so far as it controls excesses by governments, is not at all served by permitting those same governments to decide when they would like to be free of those controls and put their houses in order without further threat of complaint.” such that Attorney Generals are not able to circumvent Charter obligations through enacting or applying Rules to frustrate the Charter rights irremediably.

10.  THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit concealing that court has noted La Forest J., in Kourtessis v. M.N.R., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 53, 1993 upon citing Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, 1986 CanLII 17 (S.C.C.)(1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 161; at para 294 “ it is the Charter [Not Rules] that governs, and if the ordinary procedures fail to meet the requirements of the Charter fully, then a means must be found to give it life”. Holt C. J., instructed in Ashby v.White et al. (1709), 2 Ld. Raym. 938 at p. 953, 92 E.R. 126 at p. 136, that “if the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it...indeed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy” (at 136) as recently affirmed by at paras 22-24 by McLachlin C.J. in Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), (6 Nov 2003) SCC 62.

11.  THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to the most egregious and inhumane mischief of obstructing justice in direct breach of their statutory mandate and their oath of officer of the court of assisting with access to justice, through defrauding the court in a manner contrary to the views of Lamer C.J. , in Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, 1992 (S.C.C.) (1992), 93 D.L.R. (4th) 1; at pp. 708-9

In Osborne v. Canada (Treasury Board), 1991 CanLII 60 (S.C.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69, at p. 104, Justice Sopinka emphasized that it is necessary in fashioning a remedy for a Charter violation to both "apply the measures which will best vindicate the values expressed in the Charter" and "refrain from intruding into the legislative sphere beyond what is necessary". He determined that reading down was not appropriate in that case but concluded, at p. 104: "Reading down may in some cases be the remedy that achieves the objectives to which I have alluded while at the same time constituting the lesser intrusion into the role of the legislature."

12.  THAT AGC, BCHRT and LSS admit to having no regard for the law in general and the authority of the Supreme Court of Canada in particular and especially to display a clear contempt for the Chief Justice such that besides their disbarment they ought to be imprisoned for contempt of the Supreme Court of Canada, preferably indefinitely so that they can be precluded from offending s. 59 of the Criminal Code.